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Abstract 
We develop a model of human interaction to analyze the relationship between globalization and 
pandemics. Our framework provides joint microfoundations for the gravity equation for international 
trade and the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model of disease dynamics. We show that there 
are cross-country epidemiological externalities, such that whether a global pandemic breaks out 
depends critically on the disease environment in the country with the highest rates of domestic 
infection. A deepening of global integration can either increase or decrease the range of parameters 
for which a pandemic occurs, and can generate multiple waves of infection when a single wave would 
otherwise occur in the closed economy. If agents do not internalize the threat of infection, larger 
deaths in a more unhealthy country raise its relative wage, thus generating a form of general 
equilibrium social distancing. Once agents internalize the threat of infection, the more unhealthy 
country typically experiences a reduction in its relative wage through individual-level social 
distancing. Incorporating these individual-level responses is central to generating large reductions in 
the ratio of trade to output and implies that the pandemic has substantial effects on aggregate welfare, 
through both deaths and reduced gains from trade. 
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“As to foreign trade, there needs little to be said. The trading nations of Europe were
all afraid of us; no port of France, or Holland, or Spain, or Italy would admit our ships
or correspond with us.” (A Journal of the Plague Year, Daniel Defoe, 1665)
1 Introduction
Throughout human history, globalization and pandemics have been closely intertwined. The Black
Death arrived in Europe in October 1347 when twelve ships from the Black Sea docked at the
Sicilian port of Messina – the word quarantine originates from the Italian word for a forty-day
period of isolation required of ships and their crews during the Black Death pandemic. Much more
recently, on January 21, 2020, the first human-to-human infections of COVID-19 in Europe are
presumed to have taken place in Starnberg, Germany, when a local car parts supplier (Webasto)
organized a training session with a Chinese colleague from its operation in Wuhan, China. These
examples are by no means unique; accounts of contagion through international business travel
abound. In this paper we study the interplay between human interactions – motivated by an
economically integrated world – and the prevalence and severity of pandemics.
We develop a conceptual framework to shed light on a number of central questions about
the two-way interaction between trade and pandemics. Does a globalized world make societies
more vulnerable to pandemics? To what extent are disease dynamics different in closed and open
economies? What are the implications of pandemics for the volume and pattern of international
trade? How do these changes in the volume and pattern of international trade in turn influence
the spread of the disease? To what extent are there externalities between the health policies of
different countries in the open economy equilibrium? Will the threat of future pandemics have a
permanent impact on the nature of globalization?
Our conceptual framework combines the canonical model of international trade from economics
(the gravity equation) with the seminal model of the spread of infectious diseases from epidemiology
(the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered or SIR model). We provide joint microfoundations for these
relationships in a single underlying theory in which both international trade and the spread of
disease are driven by human interactions. Through jointly modelling these two phenomena, we
highlight a number of interrelationships between them. On the one hand, the contact rate among
individuals, which is a central parameter in benchmark epidemiology models, is endogenous in our
framework, and responds to both economic forces (e.g., the gains from international trade) and to
the dynamics of the pandemic (e.g., the perceived health risk associated with international travel).
On the other hand, we study how the emergence of a pandemic and the perceived risk of future
outbreaks shapes the dynamics of international trade, and the net gains from international trade
once the death toll from the pandemic is taken into account.
We consider an economic setting – described in Section 2 – in which agents in each country
consume differentiated varieties and choose the measures of these varieties to source from home and
abroad. We suppose that sourcing varieties is costly, both in terms of the fixed costs of meeting
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with other agents that sell varieties – an activity that involves intranational or international travel
– and the variable costs of shipping varieties. Within this environment, the measures of varieties
sourced at home and abroad are endogenously determined by trade frictions, country sizes, and
the state of a pandemic, thus determining the intensity with which agents meet one another. If a
healthy (susceptible) agent meets an infected agent, the probability that the disease is transmitted
between them depends on the local epidemiological environment where the meeting takes place.
This contagion risk associated with the local epidemiological environment is in turn shaped by
local climate, by local social and cultural norms, and also by local health policies. Therefore, since
domestic agents meet with other agents at home and abroad, the rate at which they are infected
by the disease depends not only on their home health policies but also on those abroad.
To build intuition, we begin in Sections 3 and 4 by assuming that infection does not affect the
ability of agents to produce and trade, and that agents are unaware of the threat of the infection,
which implies that they do not have an incentive to alter their individual behavior (though, in
Section 4, we allow the pandemic to cause deaths). In such a case, we show that human interactions
and trade flows are characterized by gravity equations that feature origin characteristics, destination
characteristics and measures of bilateral trade frictions. Using these gravity equations, we show
that the welfare gains from trade can be written in terms of certain sufficient statistics, namely the
domestic trade share, the change in a country’s population (i.e., deaths) that can ascribed to trade
integration, and model parameters. This is similar to the celebrated Arkolakis et al. (2012) formula
for the gains from trade, but how trade shares map into welfare changes now depends on a wider
range of model parameters than the conventional elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs.
These gravity equations also determine the dynamics of the pandemic, which take a similar form to
those of multi-group SIR model, but one in which the intensity of interactions between the different
groups is endogenously determined by international trade, and potentially evolves over the course of
the disease outbreak due to general-equilibrium effects. We find that these disease dynamics differ
systematically between the open-economy case and the closed-economy case. In particular, in the
open economy, the condition for a pandemic to be self-sustaining (i.e., ROpen0 > 1, where R
Open
0
is the global basic reproduction number) depends critically on the epidemiological environment in
the country with the highest rates of domestic infection.
We show that globalization and pandemics interact in a number of subtle ways. First, we
demonstrate that the dynamics of the disease are significantly impacted by the degree of trade
openness. More specifically, we show that a decline in any international trade or mobility friction
reduces the rates at which agents from the same country meet one another and increases the rates
at which agents from different countries meet one another. If countries are sufficiently symmetric in
all respects, a decline in any (symmetric) international trade friction also leads to an overall increase
in the total number of human interactions (domestic plus foreign). As a result, whenever countries
are sufficiently symmetric, a decline in any (symmetric) international trade friction increases the
range of parameters for which a global pandemic occurs. More precisely, even if an epidemic would
not be self-sustaining in either of the two symmetric countries in the closed economy (because
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RClosed0 < 1), it can be self-sustaining in an open economy (R
Open
0 > 1), because of the enhanced
rate of interactions between agents in the open economy.
In contrast, if countries are sufficiently different from one another in terms of some of their
primitive epidemiological parameters (i.e., the exogenous component of the infection rate or the
recovery rate from the disease), a decline in any international trade friction can have the opposite
effect of decreasing the range of parameters for which a global pandemic occurs. This situation arises
because the condition for the pandemic to be sustaining in the open economy depends critically
on the domestic rate of infections in the country with the worst disease environment. As a result,
when one country has a much worse disease environment than the other, trade liberalization can
reduce the share of that country’s interactions that occur in this worse disease environment, thereby
taking the global economy below the threshold for a pandemic to be self-sustaining for the world as
a whole. Hence, in this case, on top of the negative effect on income, tightening trade or mobility
restrictions can worsen the spread of the disease in all countries, including the relatively healthy
one.
More generally, when a pandemic occurs in the open economy, we show that its properties are
influenced by the disease environments in all countries, and can display significantly richer dynamics
than in the standard closed-economy SIR model. For instance, even without lockdowns, multiple
waves of infection can occur in the open economy, when there would only be a single wave in each
country in the closed economy.
All the results discussed so far hold even in an environment in which the pandemic causes no
deaths (or dead individuals are immediately replaced by newborn individuals). When we allow in
Section 4 for the pandemic to cause deaths and thus a decline in population, we obtain additional
general-equilibrium effects. In this case, for instance, a country with a worse disease environment
tends to experience a larger reduction in population and labor supply, which in turn leads to
an increase in its relative wage. This wage increase reduces the share of interactions that occur
in that country’s bad disease environment, and increases the share that occur in better disease
environments, which again can take the global economy below the threshold for a pandemic to
be self-sustaining. Therefore, the general equilibrium effects of the pandemic on wages and trade
patterns induce a form of “general-equilibrium social distancing” from bad disease environments
that operates even in the absence purposeful social distancing motivated by health risks.1
In Section 5, we allow individuals to internalize the threat of infection and optimally adjust
their behavior depending on the observed state of the pandemic. As in recent work (see Farboodi
et al., 2020), it proves useful to assume that agents are uncertain about their own health status,
and simply infer their health risk from the shares of their country’s population with different health
status (something they can infer from data on pandemic-related deaths). Technically, this turns the
problem faced by agents into a dynamic optimal control problem in which the number of varieties
that agents source from each country responds directly to the relative severity of the disease in
1Similar effects would operate if infections reduced the productivity of agents in the labor market, in addition to
their effects on mortality.
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each country. As in recent closed-economy models of social distancing (such as Farboodi et al.,
2020, or Toxvaerd et al., 2020), these behavioral responses reduce human interactions, and thereby
tend to flatten the curve of infections. In contrast to these closed-economy setups, these behavioral
responses now have international general equilibrium implications. In both countries, agents skew
their interactions away from the relatively unhealthy country, which leads to the largest falls in the
ratio of trade to income in the relatively healthier country. This redirection of interactions reduces
the relative demand for the unhealthy country’s goods, which in turn reduces its relative wage,
thereby having the opposite effect to the reduction in its relative labor supply from greater death.
Depending of the timing of the wave of infections in each country, which country has more infections
than the other can change over the course of the pandemic, thereby reversing this pattern of changes
in trade openness and relative wages over time. We show that introducing these individual-level
responses is central to generating large reductions in the ratio of trade to output and implies that
the pandemic has substantial effects on aggregate welfare, through both deaths and reduced gains
from trade.
Finally, we consider an extension of our dynamic framework in which there are adjustment costs
of establishing the human interactions needed to sustain trade. In the presence of these adjustment
costs, households react less aggressively to the pandemic and their reaction is smoother, which leads
to a faster and more severe pandemic with a greater total number of deaths, but less pronounced
temporary reductions in real income and trade. In deciding to accumulate contacts, households now
anticipate the costs incurred in adjusting these contacts during a pandemic, although in practice
with symmetric adjustment costs we find that these anticipatory effects are negligible.
Throughout the paper, we use as our core setup an economy with two countries where agents
can interact across borders but are subject to trade and migration frictions. Most of our results
can be easily extended to contexts with multiple regions or even a continuum of them. We focus
on international trade as our main application because of the close relationship between trade and
pandemics throughout human history. Nevertheless, these extensions could be used to flexibly study
interactions across regions within countries or neighborhoods in a city. Ultimately, the decision of
which stores to patronize in a city, and how these decisions affect local disease dynamics, is shaped
by many of the same economic trade-offs that we study in an international context in this paper.
Our paper connects with several strands of existing research. Within the international trade
literature, we build on the voluminous gravity equation literature, which includes, among many
others, the work of Anderson (1979), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum
(2003), Chaney (2008), Helpman et al. (2008), Arkolakis (2010), Allen and Arkolakis (2014), and
Allen et al. (2020). As in the work of Chaney (2008) and Helpman et al. (2008), international
trade frictions affect both the extensive and intensive margin of trade, but our model features
selection into importing rather than selection into exporting (as in Antràs et al., 2017) and, more
importantly, it emphasizes human interactions among buyers and sellers. In that latter respect, we
connect with the work on the diffusion of information in networks, which has been applied to a trade
context by Chaney (2014). By endogenizing the interplay between globalization and pandemics,
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we study the nature and size of trade-induced welfare losses associated with disease transmission,
thereby contributing to the very active recent literature on quantifying the gains from international
trade (see, for instance, Eaton and Kortum, 2002, Arkolakis et al., 2012, Melitz and Redding, 2014,
Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2015, Ossa, 2015).
Although our model is admittedly abstract, we believe that it captures the role of international
business travel in greasing the wheels of international trade. With this interpretation, our model
connects with an empirical literature that has studied the role of international business travel in
facilitating international trade (see Cristea, 2011, Blonigen and Cristea, 2015, and Startz, 2018), and
more generally, in fostering economic development (see Hovhannisyan and Keller, 2015, Campante
and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2018). Our simple microfounded model of trade through human interaction
provides a natural rationalization for a gravity equation in international trade and shows how
different types of trade frictions affect the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
Our paper also builds on the literature developing epidemiological models of disease spread,
starting with the seminal work of Kermack and McKendrick (1927, 1932). More specifically, our
multi-country SIR model shares many features with multigroup models of disease transmission, as
in the work, among others, of Hethcote (1978), Hethcote and Thieme (1985), van den Driessche
and Watmough (2002), and Magal et al. (2016).2 A key difference is that the interaction between
groups is endogenously determined by the gravity structure of international trade. The recent
COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a remarkable explosion of work by economists studying the
spread of the disease (see, for instance, Fernández-Villaverde and Jones, 2020) and exploring the
implications of several types of policies (see, for instance, Alvarez et al., 2020, Acemoglu et al.,
2020, Atkeson, 2020, or Jones et al., 2020). Within this literature, a few papers have explored
the spatial dimension of the COVID-19 pandemic by simulating multi-group SIR models applied to
various urban and regional contexts (see, among others, Argente et al., 2020, Bisin and Moro, 2020,
Cuñat and Zymek, 2020, Birge et al., 2020, and Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). Our paper also connects
with a subset of that literature, exemplified by the work of Alfaro et al. (2020), Farboodi et al.
(2020), Fenichel et al. (2011), and Toxvaerd (2020) that has studied how the behavioral response
of agents (e.g., social distancing) affects the spread and persistence of pandemics. Whereas most
of this research is concerned with COVID-19 and adopts a simulation approach, our main goal
is to develop a model of human interaction that jointly provides a microfoundation for a gravity
equation and multi-group SIR dynamics, and can be used to analytically characterize the two-way
relationship between globalization and pandemics in general.
Our work is also related to a literature in economic history that has emphasized the role of
international trade in the transmission of disease. For the case of the Black Death, Christakos et
al. (2005), Boerner and Severgnini (2014), Ricci et al. (2017), and Jedwab et al. (2019) argue
that trade routes are central to understanding the spread of the plague through medieval Europe.
In a review of a broader range of infection diseases, Saker et al. (2002) argue that globalization
2See Hetchote (2000) and Brauer and Castillo-Chavez (2012) for very useful reviews of mathematical modelling
in epidemiology, and Ellison (2020) for an economist’s overview of SIR models with heterogeneity.
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has often played a pivotal role in disease transmission. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has also
provided numerous examples of the spread of the virus through business travel.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present our baseline gravity-style
model of international trade with endogenous intranational and international human interactions.
In Section 3, we consider a first variant of the dynamics of disease spread in which the rate of
contact between agents (though endogenous) is time-invariant during the pandemic. In Section 4,
we incorporate labor supply responses to the pandemic, which affect the path of relative wages (and
thus the rate of contact of agents within and across countries) during the pandemic. In Section 5,
we incorporate individual behavioral responses motivated by agents adjusting their desired number
of human interactions in response to their fear of being infected by the disease. We offer some
concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Baseline Economic Model
We begin by developing a stylized model of the global economy in which international trade is
sustained by human interactions. Our baseline model is a simple two-country world, in which
countries use labor to produce differentiated goods that are exchanged in competitive markets via
human interactions. In Section 2.3, we outline how our model can be easily extended to settings
featuring (i) multiple countries, (ii) intermediate inputs, and (iii) scale economies and imperfect
competition.
2.1 Environment
Consider a world with two locations: East and West, indexed by i or j. We denote by J the
set of countries in the world, so for now J = {East,West}. Location i ∈ J is inhabited by a
continuum of measure Li of households, and each household is endowed with the ability to produce
a differentiated variety using labor as the only input in production. We denote by wi the wage rate
in country i.
Trade is costly. There are iceberg bilateral trade cost τij = tij × (dij)δ, when shipping from
j back to i, where dij ≥ 1 is the symmetric distance between i and j, and tij is a man-made
additional trade friction imposed by i on imports from country j. We let these man-made trade
costs be potentially asymmetric reflecting the fact that one country may impose higher restrictions
to trade (e.g., tariffs, or delays in goods clearing customs) than the other country. For simplicity,
3A well-known example in the U.S. is the conference held by biotech company Biogen in Boston, Massachusetts
on February 26 and 27, and attended by 175 executive managers, who spread the covid-19 virus to at least
six states, the District of Columbia and three European countries, and caused close to 100 infections in Mas-
sachusetts alone http://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/us/coronavirus-biogen-boston-superspreader.html). Another
example is Steve Walsh, the so-called British “super spreader,” who is linked to at least 11 new infections of
COVID-19, and who caught the disease in Singapore, while he attended a sales conference in late January of 2020
(see https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/british-coronavirus-super-spreader-may-have-infected-at-least-
11-people-in-three-countries/2020/02/10/016e9842-4c14-11ea-967b-e074d302c7d4 story.html). The initial spread of
COVID-19 to Iran and Nigeria has also been tied to international business travel.
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there are no man-made frictions to internal shipments, so tii = 1 and τii = (dii)
δ , where dii < dij
can be interpreted as the average internal distance in country i = East,West.
Each household is formed by two individuals. One of these individuals – the seller – is in
charge of producing and selling the household-specific differentiated variety from their home, while
the other individual – the buyer – is in charge of procuring varieties for consumption from other
households in each of the two locations. We let all households in country i be equally productive
in manufacturing varieties, with one unit of labor delivering Zi units of goods. Goods markets
are competitive and sellers make their goods available at marginal cost. Households have CES
preferences over differentiated varieties, with an elasticity of substitution σ > 1 regardless of the
origin of these varieties, and they derive disutility from the buyer spending time away from home.




× µij × (dij)ρ × (nij)φ , (1)
whenever the household’s buyer secures nij varieties from location j, at a distance dij ≥ 1 from
i. The parameter µij captures (possibly asymmetric) travel restrictions imposed by country j’s
government on visitors from i. The parameter c governs the cost of travel and we assume it is
large enough to ensure an interior solution in which nij ≤ Lj for all i and j ∈ J . We assume that
whenever nij < Lj , the set of varieties procured from j are chosen at random, so if all households
from i procure nij from j, each household’s variety in j will be consumed by a fraction nij/Lj of
households from i.4
















ρ × (nij)φ , (2)
where qij (k) is the quantity consumed in location i of the variety produced in location j by house-
hold k.
2.2 Equilibrium
Let us first consider consumption choices in a given household for a given nij . Maximizing (2)










4It may seem arbitrary that it is buyers rather than sellers who are assumed to travel. In section 2.3, we offer
an interpretation of the model in which trade is in intermediate inputs and the buyer travels in order to procure
the parts of components necessary for the household to produce a final consumption good. In section 2.3, we also
consider the case in which travel costs are in terms of labor, rather than a utility cost. Finally, in that same section
2.3, we also explore a variant of the model in which it is sellers rather than buyers who travel, as is often implicitly
assumed in standard models of firm participation in trade (cf., Melitz, 2003).
7
where wi is household income, wj/Zj is the common free-on-board price of all varieties produced










Multiplying equation (3) by (qij)
(σ−1)/σ, summing across locations, and rearranging, it is straight-











so real consumption equals real income.















ρ × (nij)φ . (6)
The first order condition associated with the choice of nij delivers (after plugging in (5)):













Notice that bilateral human interactions follow a ‘gravity-style’ equation that is log-separable in
origin and destination terms, and a composite of bilateral trade frictions. Evidently, natural and
man-made barriers to trade (dij , tij) and to labor mobility (µij) will tend to reduce the number
of human interactions sought by agents from country i in country j. As we show in Appendix
A.1, for the second-order conditions to be met for all values of µij , dij , and tij , we need to impose
φ > 1/ (σ − 1) and σ > 2.
Bilateral import flows by country i from country j are in turn given by






































and are thus log-separable in an origin-specific term Sj , a destination-specific term Θi, and a









5More specifically, Sj = (wj/Zj)
−φ(σ−1)










which encompasses mobility frictions (µij), transport costs (dij) and trade frictions (tij).























Notice that the distance elasticity is affected by the standard substitutability σ, but also by the
traveling cost elasticity ρ, and by the convexity φ of the traveling costs. It is clear that both
ρ > 0 and φ > 1 increase the distance elasticity relative to a standard Armington model (in which
the distance elasticity would be given by δ (σ − 1)). The other man-made bilateral frictions also
naturally depress trade flows.6
We next solve for the price index and household welfare in each country. Invoking equation (5),
















Going back to the expression for welfare in (2), and plugging (5), (7) and (11), we then find
Wi =
φ (σ − 1)− 1




which combined with (9) implies that aggregate welfare is given by
WiLi =
φ (σ − 1)− 1













This formula is a variant of the Arkolakis et al. (2012) welfare formula indicating that, with
estimates of φ and σ at hand, one could compute the change in welfare associated with a shift to
autarky only with information on the domestic trade share πii. A key difference relative to their
contribution, however, is that the combination of φ and σ relevant for welfare cannot easily be
backed out from estimation of a ‘trade elasticity’ (see equation (10)). Later, when we allow trade
to affect the transmission of disease and this disease to affect mortality, a further difference will be
that the effect of trade on aggregate welfare will also depend on its effect on mortality (via changes
in Li).
6It is also worth noting that when µij = µji and tji = tij , this gravity equation is fully symmetric, and
















We conclude our description of the equilibrium of our model by discussing the determination of
equilibrium wages. For that, it is simplest to just invoke the equality between income and spending
in each country, that is πiiwiLi + πjiwjLj = wiLi, which plugging in (9), can be written as
πii (wi, wj)× wiLi + πji (wi, wj)× wjLj = wiLi, (14)
where πii (wi, wj) and πji (wi, wj) are given in equation (9). This pair of equations (one for i and
one for j) allow us to solve for wi and wj as a function of the unique distance dij , the pair of
mobility restriction parameters µij and µji, the pair of man-made trade barriers tij and tji, and
the parameters φ, σ, δ, and ρ. Setting one of the country’s wages as the numéraire, the general
equilibrium only requires solving one of these non-linear equations in (14). Once one has solved for
this (relative) wage, it is straightforward to solve for trade flows and for the flow of buyers across
locations, as well as for the implied welfare levels.
Note that the general-equilibrium condition in (14) is identical to that obtained in standard
gravity models, so from the results in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Allen and Arkolakis (2014), or
Allen et al. (2020), we can conclude that:7
Proposition 1 As long as trade frictions Γij are bounded, there exists a unique vector of equilib-
rium wages w∗ = (wi, wj) ∈ R2++ that solves the system of equations in (14).
Using the implicit-function theorem, it is also straightforward to see that the relative wage
wj/wi will be increasing in Li, Γii, Γji, and Zj , while it will be decreasing in Lj , Γjj , Γij , and Zi.
Given the vector of equilibrium wages w = (wi, wj), we are particularly interested in studying
how changes in trade frictions (dij , tij , or µij) affect the rate of human-to-human interactions at







πij (w) , (15)
where πij (w) is given in (9) and Pi (w) in (11). Studying how nii (w) and nij (w) are shaped by the
primitive parameters of the model is complicated by the general equilibrium nature of our model,
but in Appendix A.2 we are able to show that:
Proposition 2 A decline in any international trade or mobility friction (dij , tij , tji, µij , µji) leads
to: (a) a decline in the rates (nii and njj) at which individuals will meet individuals in their own
country; and (b) an increase in the rates at which individuals will meet individuals from the other
country (nij and nji).
In words, despite the fact that changes in trade and mobility frictions obviously impact equilib-
rium relative wages, the more open are economies to the flow of goods and people across borders,
7In Alvarez and Lucas (2007), uniqueness requires some additional (mild) assumptions due to the existence of an
intermediate-input sector. Because our model features no intermediate inputs, we just need to assume that trade
frictions remain bounded.
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the larger will be international interactions and the lower will be domestic interactions.
We can also study the effect of reductions in international trade and mobility frictions on the
overall measure of varieties consumed by each household, which also corresponds to the number of
human interactions experienced by each household’s buyer (i.e., nii + nij). Similarly, we can also
study the total number of human interactions carried out by each household’s seller (i.e., nii+nji).
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General equilibrium forces complicate this comparative static, but we are able to show that (see
Appendix A.3).
Proposition 3 Suppose that countries are symmetric, in the sense that Li = L, Zi = Z, and
Γij = Γ for all i. Then, a decline in any (symmetric) international trade frictions leads to an
overall increase in human interactions (ndom + nfor ) experienced by both household buyers and
household sellers.
The assumption of full symmetry is extreme, but the result of course continues to hold true
if country asymmetries are small and trade frictions are not too asymmetric across countries.
Furthermore, exhaustive numerical simulations suggest that the result continues to hold true for
arbitrarily asymmetric declines in trade frictions, as long as countries are symmetric in size (Li = L)
and in technology (Zi = Z).
Reverting back to our general equilibrium with arbitrary country asymmetries, we can also
derive results for how changes in the labor force in either country affect the per-household measure
of interactions at home and abroad. More specifically, from equation (14), it is straightforward
to see that the relative wage wj/wi is monotonic in the ratio Li/Lj . Furthermore, working with
equations (7) and (11), we can establish (see Appendix A.4 for a proof):
Proposition 4 A decrease in the relative size of country i’s population leads to a decrease in the
rates nii and nji at which individuals from all countries will meet individuals in country i, and to
an increase in the rates njj and nij at which individuals from all countries will meet individuals in
the other country j.
This result will prove useful in Section 4, where we study how general equilibrium forces partly
shape the dynamics of an epidemic. For instance, if the epidemic affects labor supply dispropor-
tionately in one of the countries, then the implied increase in that country’s relative wage will
induce a form of general equilibrium social distancing, as it will incentivize home buyers to avoid
that country, even without social distancing motivated by health risks.
2.3 Extensions
Our baseline economic model is special among many dimensions, so it is important to discuss the
robustness of some of the key insights we take away from our economic model. Because the gravity
equation of international trade can be derived under a variety of economic environments and market
8Note that despite us modeling a frictionless labor market, the assumed symmetry of all households implies that
no household has any incentive to hire anybody to buy or sell goods on its behalf.
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structures, it is perhaps not too surprising that many of the key features of our model carry over
to alternative environments featuring multiple countries, intermediate input trade, scale economies
and imperfect competition. We next briefly describe four extensions of our model, but we leave all
mathematical details to the Appendix (see Appendix C).
Some readers might object to the fact that, in our baseline model, production uses labor, while
the traveling cost is specified in terms of a utility cost. We make this assumption to identify
international travel with specific members of the household, which facilitates a more transparent
transition to a model of disease transmission driven by human-to-human interactions. Nevertheless,
in terms of the mechanics of our economic model, this assumption is innocuous. More specifically,
in the first extension studied in Appendix C, we show that Propositions 1 through 4 continue to
hold whenever travel costs in equation (1) are specified in terms of labor rather than being modelled
as a utility cost. In fact, this version of the model is isomorphic to our baseline model above, except
for a slightly different expression for the equilibrium price index Pi.
The assumption that households travel internationally to procure consumption goods may seem
unrealistic. Indeed, international business travel may be better thought as being a valuable input
when firms need specialized inputs and seek potential providers of those inputs in various countries.
Fortunately, it is straightforward to re-interpret our model along those lines by assuming that
the differentiated varieties produced by households are intermediate inputs, which all households
combine into a homogeneous final good, which in equilibrium is not traded. The details of this
re-interpretation are worked out in the second extension studied in Appendix C.
Returning to our baseline economic model, in Appendix C we next derive our key equilibrium
conditions for a world economy with multiple countries. In fact, all the equations above, except
for the labor-market clearing condition (14) apply to that multi-country environment once the set
of countries J is re-defined to include multiple countries. The labor-market condition is in turn
simply given by
∑
j∈J πij (w)wjLj = wiLi, where πij (w) is defined in (9). Similarly, the model
is also easily adaptable to the case in which there is a continuum of locations i ∈ Ω, where Ω is
a closed and bounded set of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. The equilibrium conditions are
again unaltered, with integrals replacing summation operators throughout.
Finally, in Appendix C we explore a variant of our model in which it is the household’s seller
rather than the buyer who travels to other locations. We model this via a framework featuring scale
economies, monopolistic competition and fixed cost of exporting, as in the literature on selection
into exporting emanating from the seminal work of Melitz (2003), except that the seller fixed costs
are a function of the measure of buyers reached in a destination market. Again, Propositions 1
through 4 continue to hold in such an environment.
3 A Two-Country SIR Model with Time-Invariant Interactions
So far, we have just characterized a static (steady-state) model of international trade supported by
international travel. Now let us consider the case in which the model above describes a standard
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“day” in the household. More specifically, in the morning the buyer in each household in i leaves the
house and visits nii sellers in i and nij sellers in j, procuring goods from each of those households.
For simplicity, assume that buyers do not travel together or otherwise meet each other. While the
buyer visits other households and procures goods, the seller in each household sells its own goods
to visitors to their household. There will be nii domestic visitors and nji foreign visitors. In the
evening, the two members of the household reunite.
3.1 Preliminaries
With this background in mind, consider now the dynamics of contagion. As in the standard
epidemiological model, we divide the population at each point in time into Susceptible households,
Infectious households, and Recovered households (we will incorporate deaths in the next section).
We think of the health status as being a household characteristic, implicitly assuming a perfect rate
of transmission within the household (they enjoy a passionate marriage), and also that recovery is
experienced contemporaneously by all household members. For simplicity, we ignore the possibility
that a vaccine puts an end to an epidemic before herd immunity is achieved.
In this section we seek to study the dynamics of a two-country SIR model in which the pandemic
only generates cross-country externalities via contagion (and not via terms of trade effects), and
in which households do not exert any pandemic-motivated social distancing. Hence, we assume
that the infection has no effect on the ability to work and trade or mortality, and that agents
are unaware of the threat of infection and their health status, which implies that they have no
incentive to change their individual behavior. Labor supply and aggregate income are constant in
each country and over time, because there are no deaths and households have no incentive to social
distance. We relax these assumptions in Section 4, where we allow for deaths from the disease, but
assume that agents remain unaware of the threat of infection and their health status, and hence
continue to have no incentive to change their individual behavior. The result is a model in which
the dynamics of the pandemic affect the evolution of the labor supply and aggregate income in
each country. In Section 5 we go further and assume that agents understand that if they become
infected, they have a positive probability of dying (an event that they, of course, do notice!). The
possibility of dying generates behavioral responses to prevent contagion by reducing interactions.
In sum, the goal of this section is to understand how cross-country interactions motivated by
economic incentives affect the spread of a pandemic in a world in which these interactions are time-
invariant during the pandemic. It is important to emphasize, however, that the fixed measure of
interactions chosen by each household is still endogenously shaped by the primitive parameters of
our model, as described in Section 2. We will be particularly interested in studying the incidence
and dynamics of the pandemic for different levels of trade integration, and different values of the
primitive epidemiological parameters (the contagion rate conditional on a number of interactions
and the recovery rate) in each country.
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3.2 The Dynamic System
As argued above, for now, the population, technology and relative wage will all be time-invariant,
so we can treat nii, nij , nji and njj as fixed parameters (though obviously their constant level is
shaped by the primitives of the model).
The share of households of each type evolve according to the following laws of motion (we ignore
time subscripts for now to keep the notation tidy):
Ṡi = −2nii × αi × Si × Ii − nij × αj × Si × Ij − nji × αi × Si × Ij (16)
İi = 2nii × αi × Si × Ii + nij × αj × Si × Ij + nji × αi × Si × Ij − γiIi (17)
Ṙi = γiIi (18)
To better understand this system, focus first on how infections grow in equation (17). The first
term 2nii×αi×Si× Ii in this equation captures newly infected households in country i. Sellers in
i receive (in expectation) nii domestic buyers, while buyers meet up with nii domestic sellers. The
household thus jointly has 2nii domestic contacts. In those encounters, a new infection occurs with
probability αi whenever one of the agents is susceptible (which occurs with probability Si) and the
other agent is infectious (which occurs with probability Ii).
9 The second term of equation (17)
reflects new infections of country i’s households that occur in the foreign country when susceptible
buyers from i (of which there are Si) visit foreign households with infectious sellers. There are nij
of those meetings, leading to an new infection with probability αj whenever the foreign seller is
infectious (which occurs with probability Ij). Finally, the third term in (17) reflects new infections
associated with susceptible sellers in country i receiving infectious buyers from abroad (country j).
Each susceptible domestic buyer (constituting a share Si of i’s population) has nji such meetings,
which cause an infection with probability αi whenever the foreign buyer is infectious (which occurs
with probability Ij). The final term in equation (17) simply captures the rate at which infectious
individuals recover (γi), and note that we assume that this recovery rate only depends on the
country in which infected agents reside, regardless of where they got infected.
Once the equation determining the dynamics of new infections is determined, the one deter-
mining the change of susceptible agents in (16) is straightforward to understand, as it just reflects
a decline in the susceptible population commensurate with new infections. Finally, equation (18)
governs the transition from infectious households to recovered households.
In Section B of the Appendix, we provide further details on the numerical simulations of the two-
country SIR model that we use in the figures below to illustrate our results, including a justification
for the parameter values we use.
9In summing the buyer and seller domestic contact rates to obtain a domestic contact rate of 2nii for the household,
we use the property of continuous time that there is zero probability that the buyer and seller are simultaneously
infected at exactly the same instant.
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3.3 The Closed-Economy Case
Our model reduces to a standard SIR model when there is no movement of people across countries,
and thus no international trade. In such a case, the system in (16)-(18) reduces to
Ṡi = −βi × Si × Ii
İi = βi × Si × Ii − γiIi
Ṙi = γiIi
where βi = 2nii is the so-called contact rate. The dynamics of this system have been studied
extensively since the pioneering work of Kermack and McKendrick (1927, 1932). Suppose that at
some time t0, there is an outbreak of a disease which leads to initial infections Ii (t0) = ε > 0,
where ε is small. Because ε is small, Si (t0) is very close to 1, and from the second equation,
we have the standard result that if the so-called basic reproduction number R0i = βi/γi is less
than one, then, İi (t) < 0 for all t > t0, and the infection quickly dies out. In other words, when
R0i = βi/γi < 1 an epidemic-free equilibrium is globally stable. If instead R0i = βi/γi > 1, the
number of new infections necessarily rises initially and the share of susceptible households declines
until the system reaches a period t∗ at which Si (t
∗) = γi/βi, after which infections decline and
eventually go to 0. The steady-state values of Si (∞) in this epidemic equilibrium is determined
by the solution to this simple non-linear equation:10
lnSi (∞) = −
βi
γi
(1− Si (∞)) . (19)
This equation admits a unique solution with 1 > Si (∞) > 0.11 Furthermore, because Si (∞) <
γi/βi (since Si (t
∗) = γi/βi at the peak of infections), differentiation of (19) implies that the
steady-state share of susceptible households Si (∞) is necessarily decreasing in R0i. In sum, in the
closed-economy case, Si (∞) = 1 as long as R0i ≤ 1, but when R0i > 1, the higher is R0i, the lower
is Si (∞), and the more people will have been infected by the end of the epidemic.
3.4 The Open-Economy Case
We can now return to the two-country system in (16)-(18). We first explore the conditions under
which a pandemic-free equilibrium is stable, and infections quickly die out worldwide, regardless
of where the disease originated. For that purpose, it suffices to focus on the laws of motion for
10To see this, begin by writing
Ṡi
Si




Now taking logs and integrating, and imposing Ii (∞) = 0, delivers
lnSi (∞)− lnSi (t0) = −
βi
γi
(1− Si (∞)−Ri (0)) .
Finally, imposing lnSi (t0) ' 0 and Ri (t0) ' 0, we obtain equation (19).
11Equation (19) is obviously also satisified when Si (∞) = 1, but this equilibrium is not stable when R0i > 1.
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(Si, Sj , Ii, Ij) evaluated at the pandemic-free equilibrium, in which Si = Sj ' 1 and Ii = Ij ' 0.
The Jacobian of this system is given by
J =

0 0 −2αinii − (αjnij + αinji)
0 0 − (αjnij + αinji) −2αjnjj
0 0 2αinii − γi αjnij + αinji
0 0 αjnij + αinji 2αjnjj − γj
 ,











4 (αjnij + αinji)
2 + ((2αinii − γi)− (2αjnjj − γj))2.
Since we are interested in finding necessary conditions for stability of this equilibrium (i.e., λmax <
0), and noting that λmax is increasing in nij and nji, we have that
λmax ≥ λmax|nij=nji=0 = max {2αinii − γi, 2αjnjj − γjj} . (20)
As a result, a pandemic-free equilibrium can only be stable whenever 2αinii/γi ≤ 1 and 2αjnjj/γjj ≤
1. In words, if the reproduction number R0i based only on domestic interactions (but evaluated at
the world equilibrium value of nii) is higher than 1 in any country, the pandemic-free equilibrium
is necessarily unstable, and the world will experience at least one period of rising infections along
the dynamics of the pandemic. This result highlights the externalities that countries exert on other
countries when the disease is not under control purely based on the domestic interactions of agents.
It is interesting to note that we achieve the exact same result when studying the global repro-
duction number R0 associated with the world equilibrium dynamics. Remember that R0 is defined
as the expected number of secondary cases produced by a single (typical) infection starting from a
completely susceptible population. Because our model maps directly to multigroup models of dis-
ease transmission, we can invoke (and verify) results from that literature to provide an alternative
analysis of the stability of the pandemic-free equilibrium in our two-country dynamic system (cf.,
Hethcote, 1978, Hethcote and Thieme, 1985, van den Driessche and Watmough, 2002, Magal et al.
2016). In particular, it is a well-known fact that the pandemic-free equilibrium is necessarily stable
if R0 < 1. In order to compute R0, we follow the approach in Diekmann et al. (1990), and write
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The next generation matrix FV −1 (evaluated at t = t0, and thus Si (t0) = Sj (t0) ' 1) is given by
FV −1 =
[
2αinii/γi (αjnij + αinji) /γj
(αjnij + αinji) /γi 2αjnjj/γj
]
.



































As in the case of λmax in equation (20), we have that R0 is nondecreasing in nij and nji, and thus









This confirms again that the disease can only be contained (that is, the pandemic-free equilibrium
is stable) only if both countries’ disease reproduction rate based on their domestic interactions is
less than one.12 Therefore, even if a country has a strict disease environment that would prevent an
epidemic under autarky, it may be drawn into a world pandemic in the open economy equilibrium,
if its trade partner has a lax disease environment, as measured by its open economy domestic
reproduction rate.
Having described the existence and stability of a pandemic-free equilibrium, we next turn to a
situation in which R0 > 1 and the resulting contagion dynamics lead to a pandemic. Building on
the existing literature on multigroup models of disease transmission, it is well known that whenever
the global reproduction rate satisfies R0 > 1, there exists a unique asymptotically globally stable
‘pandemic’ equilibrium in which the growth in the share of worldwide infected households necessarily
increases for a period of time, and then declines to a point at which infections vanish and the share
of susceptible households in the population in each country (Si (∞) , Sj (∞)) takes a value strictly
between 0 and 1 (see, for instance, Hethcote, 1978).13 Starting from equations (16)-(18), and
going through analogous derivations as in the closed-economy case (see Appendix D), we obtain
the following system of nonlinear equations pinning down the steady-state values (Si (∞) , Sj (∞))
12Although the expressions for λmax andR0 appear different, it is straightforward to show that a necessary condition















If either 2αinii/γi > 1 or 2αjnjj/γj > 1, this condition cannot possibly hold.
13Proving global stability of the endemic equilibrium is challenging for some variants of the SIR model, but for
the simple one in (16)-(18), featuring permanent immunity and no vital dynamics, global stability of the endemic
equilibrium is implied by the results in Hethcote (1978), particularly section 6.
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of the share of susceptible households in each country in that pandemic equilibrium:






(1− Sj (∞)) (23)






(1− Si (∞)) . (24)
Although we cannot solve this system in closed form, we can easily derive some comparative
statics. In particular, total differentiating we find that the steady-state values of Si and Sj are
decreasing in nii, njj , nij , and nji, and are increasing in γi and γj (see Appendix D).
We summarize these results in this section with the following proposition (see Appendix D for
a proof):
Proposition 5 Assume that there is trade between the two countries (i.e., αjnij + αinji > 0),
which implies that the next generation matrix FV −1 is irreducible. If R0 ≤ 1, the no-pandemic
equilibrium is the unique stable equilibrium. If R0 > 1, the no-pandemic equilibrium is unstable,
and there exists a unique stable endemic equilibrium with a steady-state featuring no infections
(Ii (∞) = Ij (∞) = 0) and shares of susceptible agents Si (∞) ∈ (0, 1) and Sj (∞) ∈ (0, 1) that
satisfy equations (23) and (24).
In Figure 1, we illustrate these analytical results by holding the infection rate in Country 1
(α1) constant and varying the infection rate in Country 2 (α2). The starting point is two identical
countries with a common infection rate of α1 = α2 = 0.04. The rest of the parameter values are
described in Appendix B. For this initial common infection rate, the global reproduction number
is R0 = 0.75, and the open economy domestic reproduction rates are R01 = R02 = 0.46. Thus,
the initial infection quickly dies out and there is no global pandemic. The fraction of recovered
agents in the long run, Ri (∞), which is equal to the cumulative number of infected agents in the
absence of deaths, is essentially zero in both countries. The left panel of Figure 1 plots Ri (∞) as a
function of R0 as we progressively increase α2 from 0.04 to 0.10. The value of R0 is monotone in α2
and increases from 0.75 to 1.46. Hence, as the exogenous infection rate of Country 2 increases, the
global reproduction rate increases beyond the critical value of 1, and the world experiences a global
pandemic. Note how the fraction of the cumulative number of recovered agents rises rapidly once
R0 increases beyond 1 and both countries go through increasingly severe pandemics. Note also the
importance of cross-country contagion in the open economy. Even though nothing is changing in
the domestic characteristics of Country 1, it is dramatically affected by the worsening conditions
in Country 2. The right panel shows the evolution of the pandemic in Country 1 for different levels
of severity of the disease environment in Country 2.14 The most severe and rapid pandemics are
associated with the highest values of α2 (the lightest curve in the graph). As α2 declines and R0
falls and crosses the value of 1, the evolution of inflections flattens and becomes longer, until the
pandemic eventually disappears.
14The color of each curve, correspond to the colors of the points in the left panel.
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Figure 1: The Impact of Changes in the Exogenous Infection Rate in Country 2, α2
The value of R0 is critical to determine the stability of a pandemic-free equilibrium. However,
it is worth emphasizing that is not critical to determine the existence of a pandemic cycle in each
country. For values of R0 close enough to 1, an individual country can experience a pandemic, even
if the world as a whole does not, if the declining number of cases in the other country is sufficiently
large. Similarly, even if R0 > 1, some countries might not experience a pandemic when R0 is close
enough to 1, even if the world economy as a whole does, since cases might be rising sufficiently
fast in the other country. In Figure 1, in fact, cases rise slowly when the economy crosses the
R0 = 1 threshold. At that point, pandemics are small and happen only in the sick country, while
the number of cases in the healthy country remain essentially steady. The peak of infections in
both countries is a smooth function of the value of α2.
3.5 Trade Integration and Global Pandemics
We now turn to the question of how globalization affects the prevalence and severity of a pandemic
in both countries. In terms of the stability of a pandemic-free equilibrium, inspection of equations
(20) and (22) might lead one to infer that avoiding a pandemic is always more difficult in a globalized
world. On the one hand, it is obvious that, for given positive values of nii and njj , if the ratio αi/γj
is sufficiently high in any country in the world, a global pandemic affecting all countries cannot
be avoided, even though the country with the lower ratio αi/γj might well have avoided it under
autarky. On the other hand, it would seem that even when αi = αj and γi = γj , the max operator
in (20) and (22) implies that the pandemic-free equilibrium is less likely to be stable in the open
economy. It is important to emphasize, however, that nii and njj are endogenous objects and will
naturally be lower, the lower are trade frictions, as formalized in Proposition 2. Still, it seems
intuitive that globalization will typically foster more human interactions, as these are necessary to
materialize the gains associated with trade integration, and that this will generally make it easier
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for pandemics to occur.
To explore this more formally, let us first consider a fully symmetric world in which all primitives
of the model (population size, technology, trade barriers, recovery rates, etc.) are common in both
countries, so that we have nii = njj = ndom, nij = nji = nfor, αi = αj = α, and γi = γj = γ. In
such a case, we have
λmax = 2α (ndom + nfor)− γ; R0 =
2α (ndom + nfor)
γ
,
and it thus follows immediately from Proposition 3 that a decline in any (symmetric) international
trade friction increases R0 and thus decreases the range of parameters for which a pandemic-
free equilibrium is stable. Furthermore, in this same symmetric case, the steady-state share of
susceptible households in the population is identical in both countries and implicitly given by
lnSi (∞) = −
2α (ndom + nfor)
γ
(1− Si (∞)) ,
and thus not only the frequency but also the severity of the pandemic are higher the lower are
(symmetric) trade frictions.
We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 6 Suppose that countries are symmetric, in the sense that Li = L, Zi = Z, Γij = Γ,
αi = αj, and γi = γ for all i. Then, a decline in any (symmetric) international trade friction:
(i) increases R0, thus decreasing the range of parameters for which a pandemic-free equilibrium is
stable, and (ii) increases the share of each country’s population that becomes infected during the
pandemic when R0 > 1.
Although we have so far focused on a fully symmetric case, the main results in this Proposition
continue to hold true even if countries are not perfectly symmetric. More generally, and as noted















and thus what is key for the effects of reductions of trade and mobility barriers on the occurrence of
pandemics is whether the left-hand-side of this expression increases or declines with those reductions
in barriers.
Figure 2 illustrates part (i) of Proposition 6 for a case in which we introduce an asymmetry in
the exogenous infection rate across countries but the parameter condition in (25) is still satisfied.
We let α1 = 0.04 and α2 = 0.07 and study the cumulative number of recovered agents when we
increase symmetric international trade frictions (tij , left panel) and mobility frictions (µij , right
panel). The first point on both graphs, when t12 = t21 = µ12 = µ21 = 1, is one of the cases we
studied in Figure 1. The large infection rate in Country 2 generates a pandemic in both countries.
Globalization is essential to generate this pandemic. As both graphs illustrate, as we increase
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either tariffs or mobility restrictions, global interactions decline, and the total number of recovered
agents decreases. Eventually, when the world is sufficiently isolated, the pandemic disappears and
the pandemic-free equilibrium becomes stable. In both graphs, the value of R0 (plotted in orange
and measured in the right axis) declines smoothly with frictions. The vertical line in the figure
indicates the value of tariffs or mobility frictions, respectively, corresponding to R0 = 1.15 Clearly,
both types of barriers generate similar qualitative reductions in Ri (∞) , although for this specific
set of parameter values, the migration restrictions needed to eliminate the pandemic are larger than
the corresponding trade frictions.
Figure 2: The Impact of Changes in Trade (left) and Mobility (right) Frictions
Figure 3 illustrates part (ii) of Proposition 6 by depicting the evolution of the fraction of agents
infected for different levels of trade frictions. It corresponds to the exercise on the left panel of
Figure 2 (with α2 = 0.07 > 0.04 = α1), so the lightest curves represent the evolution of the fraction
of infected for the case with free trade (t12 = t21 = 1), and the darkest curves represent the case
when t12 = t21 = 1.5. Clearly, as we increase tariffs, the epidemic in both countries becomes less
severe and prolonged. The peak of the infection curve declines monotonically, as does the total
number of recovered agents. Eventually, although impossible to appreciate in the graph, high tariffs
eliminate the pandemic altogether and infections decline monotonically from their initial value.
Although in most cases condition (25) becomes tighter the lower are trade and mobility barriers,
it is instructive to explore scenarios in which greater integration may actually reduce the risk of a
pandemic. Suppose, in particular, that country j is a much lower risk environment, in the sense
that αj is very low – so infections are very rare – and γj is very high – so infected households
15Note that the value of Ri (∞), does not become zero for either country right at the point where tariffs or mobility
frictions lead R0 to become greater than one. The reason is that even though one of the countries necessarily avoids a
pandemic, it lingers close to its initial value of infections for a long time, which accumulates to a positive cumulative
number of recovered agents.
21
Figure 3: The Impact of Changes in Trade Frictions on the Evolution of Infections










For a high value of γj , it is then straightforward to see that the fall in country i’s domestic
interactions nii associated with a reduction in international barriers makes this constraint laxer,
even if nji goes up with that liberalization. In those situations it is perfectly possible for a
pandemic-free equilibrium worldwide to only be stable when barriers are low. The intuition for
this result is straightforward. In such a scenario, globalization makes it economically appealing for
agents from a high-risk country to increase their interactions with agents in a low-risk country, and
despite the fact that overall interactions by these agents may increase, the reduction in domestic
interactions in their own high-risk environment is sufficient to maintain the disease in check.
More generally, beyond this limiting case, if countries differ enough in their epidemiological
parameters, even when R0 > 1, it may well be the case that a decline in international trade
frictions actually ameliorates the pandemic by incentivizing agents in the high-risk country to shift
more of their interactions to the low-risk country.
We summarize this result as follows:
Proposition 7 When the contagion rate αi and the recovery rate γi vary sufficiently across coun-
tries, a decline in any international trade friction (i) decreases R0, thus increasing the range of
parameters for which a pandemic-free equilibrium is stable, and (ii) when R0 > 1, it reduces the
share of the population in the high-risk (high αi, low γi) country that becomes infected during the
pandemic, and it may also reduce the share of the population in the low-risk (low αi, high γi)
country that become infected during the pandemic.
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An interesting implication of the last statement of Proposition 7 is that although it would seem
intuitive that a healthy country should impose high restrictions to the inflow of individuals from a
high-risk country where a disease has just broken out, in some cases such restrictions may in fact
contribute to the spread of the disease in the high-risk country, which may then make a global
pandemic inevitable unless mobility restrictions are set at prohibitive levels.
Figure 4: The Impact of Changes in Trade (left) and Mobility (right) Frictions with Large Differ-
ences in Infection Rates Across Countries (α1 = 0.008 and α2 = 0.052)
Figure 4 presents examples in which increases in trade and mobility barriers eliminate the
possibility of a pandemic-free equilibrium (as predicted by part (i) of Proposition 7). As we argued
above, to generate these examples we need large differences in exogenous infection rates. The
figure makes the exogenous infection rate in the healthy country, Country 1, extremely small at
α1 = 0.008, and sets α2 = 0.052 (a standard value).
16 In both panels, increases in frictions
now lead to increases in R0 (again depicted in orange and measured in the right axis). Without
frictions the pandemic-free equilibrium is stable. Agents in Country 2 interact sufficiently with
the healthier Country 1, which helps them avoid the pandemic. As both economies impose more
frictions, domestic interactions increase rapidly, while foreign interactions drop. This is bad news
for Country 2, since its larger infection rate now leads to a pandemic. Perhaps surprisingly, it is
also bad news for Country 1 since, although it interacts less with Country 2, it does so sufficiently
to experience a pandemic. Larger frictions, which decrease aggregate income in both countries
smoothly, also worsen the pandemic in both countries, at least when frictions are not too large;
a clear case for free trade and mobility. Of course, as frictions increase further, eventually they
isolate Country 1 sufficiently and so the severity of its local pandemic declines. In autarky, Country
1 avoids the pandemic completely, but at a large cost in the income of both countries. In contrast,
higher frictions always worsen the pandemic in Country 2. Contacts with the healthy country are
16Relative to the baseline parameters the example also lowers c to 0.1 and φ to 1.5. These additional changes
increase the overall number of domestic and foreign interactions.
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always beneficial, since they dilute interactions with locals, which are more risky.
In Figure 5 we illustrate part (ii) of Proposition 7 for the case with high differences in exogenous
infection rates across countries that we presented in Figure 4. We focus on three specific exercises:
A case with free trade where t12 = t21 = 1, another with intermediate tariffs where t12 = t21 = 1.2,
and a third one where countries are in autarky. With free trade, there is no pandemic in either
country. As we increase trade frictions, a pandemic develops in both countries, although it is much
more severe in Country 2, the country with the higher exogenous infection rate. Still, the pandemic
in Country 1 ends up infecting around 1% of the population. Moving to autarky eliminates the
pandemic for Country 1, but makes it even more severe, faster, and with a higher peak, in Country
2. Closing borders helps the healthy country eliminate the pandemic only if trade is completely
eliminated, and at the cost of a much more severe pandemic in Country 2 and larger income losses
for everyone. Although Figure 5 uses countries of identical size and studies the case of changes in
symmetric tariffs, we obtain very similar results when countries are asymmetric, or when Country 1,
the healthy country, is the only country closing its borders. Similar examples can also be generated
when considering mobility rather than trade frictions, as in the right panel of Figure 4. The essential
ingredient for declines in international frictions to ameliorate the pandemic, on top of increasing
incomes, is for countries to exhibit large asymmetries in epidemiological conditions.
Figure 5: Evolution of Infections under Free Trade, Intermediate Trade Frictions, and Autarky
with Large Differences in Infection Rates Across Countries (α1 = 0.008 and α2 = 0.052)
3.6 Transitional Dynamics: A Second Wave
When R0 > 1 and the world economy converges to the pandemic steady-state equilibrium in
equations (23) and (24), convergence to that steady-state may entail significantly richer dynamics
than in the closed-economy SIR model. In particular, in the open economy, integrating the dynamics
of infections in each country using the initial conditions Si (0) = Sj (0) = 1 and Ri (0) = Rj (0) = 0,
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we have the following closed-form solutions for infections in each country at each point in time (Iit,
Ijt) as a function of susceptibles in each country (Si (t), Sj (t)):
Ii (t) = 1− Si (t) +







Ij (t) = 1− Sj (t) +







In the closed economy, there is necessarily a single wave of infections in the absence of a lockdown
or other time-varying health policies. In contrast, in the open economy, it becomes possible for
a country to experience multiple waves of infections, even in the absence of lockdowns or other
time-varying health policies. From equations (26) and (27), the rate of growth of infections in each
country is highest when Si (t) = Sj (t) = 1, and declines as the number of susceptibles in each
country falls, but the decline with Si (t) occurs at a different rate from the decline with Sj (t). It
is this difference that creates the possibility of multiple waves. If one country has a wham-bam
epidemic that is over very quickly in the closed economy, while the other country has an epidemic
that builds slowly in the closed economy, this creates the possibility for the country with the quick
epidemic in the closed economy to have multiple peaks of infections in the open economy. The first
peak reflects the rapid explosion of infections in that country, which dissipates quickly. The second
peak, which is in general smaller, reflects the evolution of the pandemic in its trading partner.
In Figure 6 we provide an example of such a case, in which Country 1 experiences two waves
of infections in the open economy, whereas Country 2 experiences a single, more prolonged and
severe, wave. Country 1 features a large value of α1, but also a large value of γ1. Thus, although
the infection rate is large, people remain contagious only briefly (perhaps because of a good contact
tracing program). The resulting domestic reproduction rate R01 = 1.08 and the resulting first peak
of the pandemic is relatively small and quick. Since Country 1 is assumed ten times smaller than
Country 2, its small initial pandemic has no significant effect on Country 2. There, the infection rate
is much smaller, but the disease remains contagious for much longer, leading to a larger R01 = 1.66,
which also results in a global reproduction number R0 = 1.66.17 The result is a more protracted
but also much longer singled-peaked pandemic in Country 2. This large pandemic does affect the
smaller country through international economic interactions. The large country amounts for many
of the interactions of the small country, which leads to the second wave of the pandemic in Country
2. Essential for this example is that countries have very different timings for their own pandemics
in autarky, but also that in the open economy the relationship is very asymmetric, with the small
country having little effect on the large country but the large country influencing the small country
significantly. If the interactions are large enough in both directions, both countries will end up with
a synchronized pandemic with only one peak.
17The parameter values used in the exercise are σ = 4.5, L1 = 2, L2 = 20, d12 = d11, c = 0.12, α1 = 0.69, α2 = 0.09,
γ1 = 2.1 and γ2 = 0.18. All other values are identical to the baseline case.
25
Figure 6: Multiple Waves of Infection in the Open Economy
4 General-Equilibrium Induced Responses
In this section, we allow the infection to affect mortality, but continue to assume that agents are
unaware of the threat of infection.18 There are two main implications of introducing deaths. First,
the pandemic will now affect aggregate income (and thus welfare) in both countries, as households
that die as a result of the pandemic will forego the net present discounted value of their future
lifetime utility, which in our model is proportional to real income. Second, because deaths are not
immediately replaced by new inflows into the labor force, the pandemic will affect labor supply
and aggregate demand in each country, and this will impact equilibrium relative wages and real
income.19 In Section 5, we further generalize the analysis to allow individuals to internalize the
threat of infection and incorporate behavioral responses.
With this new assumption, the shares of households of each type evolve according to the fol-
lowing laws of motion (where we again ignore time subscripts to keep the notation tidy):
Ṡi = −2nii (w)× αi × Si × Ii − [nij (w)× αj + nji (w)× αi]× Si × Ij (28)
İi = 2nii (w)× αi × Si × Ii + [nij (w)× αj + nji (w)× αi]× Si × Ij − (γi + ηi) Ii (29)
Ṙi = γiIi (30)
Ḋi = ηiIi (31)
18We implicitly assume that if one of the household members dies, the other one does too. So it is not only a
passionate marriage, but also a romantic one (in the narrow sense of the word).
19We could easily introduce a set of agents that are symptomatic infected agents who also reduce their labor supply,
but that would complicate the analysis and blur the comparison with the results in the previous section.
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There are two main differences between this dynamic system and the one above in (16)-(18).
First, we now have four types of agents, as some infected agents transition to death rather than
recovery. The rate at which infected agents die is given by ηi, and as in the case of the rate of
recovery γi, it only depends on the country in which infected agents reside, and not on where
they got infected. Second, we now need to make explicit the dependence of the contact rates
nii (w), nij (w) and nij (w) on the vector of equilibrium wages w. As the changes in each country’s
population caused by deaths affect wages, these contact rates are no longer time invariant, and
evolve endogenously over the course of the pandemic. In particular, the equilibrium wage vector is
determined by the following goods market clearing condition:∑
j∈J
πji (w)wj (1−Dj)Lj = wi (1−Di)Li,
where remember that πij (w) and nij (w) are given by (9) and (15), respectively.
We now show that this endogeneity of wages introduces a form of general equilibrium social
distancing into the model. In particular, if the country with a worse disease environment experiences
more deaths, its relative wage will rise. As this country’s relative wage increases, its varieties become
relatively less attractive to agents in the country with the better disease environment. Therefore,
purely from the general equilibrium force of changes in relative labor supplies, agents in the healthy
country engage in a form of endogenous social distancing, in which they skew their interactions away
from the country with a worse disease environment, as summarized in the following proposition
(see Appendix A.8 for a proof):
Proposition 8 If country j experiences more deaths than country i, the resulting change in relative
wages (wj/wi) leads country i to reduce its interactions with country j and increase its interactions
with itself (general equilibrium social distancing).
It is worth stressing that even if one of the countries features more favorable primitive health
parameters than the other one, which country appears de facto more unhealthy can change over
the course of the pandemic if the two countries’ waves of infection are staggered in time. In the
initial stages of the pandemic one country may experience a larger relative reduction in its labor
supply (leading to endogenous social distancing in the other country), while in the later stages of
the pandemic the other country experiences a larger relative reduction in its labor supply (leading
to the opposite pattern of endogenous social distancing).20
Another straightforward implication of explicitly modeling deaths is that they naturally affect
aggregate income in both countries. More specifically, whenever changes in trade or mobility bar-
riers affect population, aggregate real income (wiLi/Pi) and aggregate welfare (WiLi) are directly
impacted by trade-induced changes in population. Because around R0 = 1 deaths are particularly
20Although we have established this general equilibrium social distancing mechanism using death as the source of
changes in relative labor supplies, if the disease also were to reduce the productivity of workers while they are infected,
this additional source of labor supply movements would naturally exacerbate the general equilibrium interactions
between countries.
27
responsive to changes in trade frictions, this effect is not necessarily negligible when evaluating the
welfare implications of trade in a world with global pandemics.
Figure 7: General Equilibrium Induced Social Distancing
We close this section by illustrating the result in Proposition 8 with a numerical example,
where we let η1/ (η1 + γ1) = 0.01 and η2/ (η2 + γ2) = 0.50. Namely, we let the death rate among
the infected be 1% in Country 1 and, an admittedly extreme, 50% in Country 2. The large difference
in death rates amplifies the general equilibrium effects. The rest of the parameters are set to their
baseline, symmetric values, across countries. Figure 7 presents the results. We denote by ‘SIRD
model’ the case in which we incorporate deaths. For comparison purposes, we also present results
for the case when η1 = η2 = 0, which we label the ‘SIR model.’ The larger death rate in Country 2
leads to a relative decrease in its labor supply, which increases relative wages, as illustrated in the
top-left panel. Since the countries are otherwise symmetric and we chose the wage of Country 1 as
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the numéraire, only the wage of Country 2 increases above one in the case where death rates are
positive. The resulting increase in relative wage is small (0.5%) even though about 6% of agents
end up dying in Country 2. Labor supply falls, but so does the aggregate demand for goods in
that country. The larger wage in Country 2 implies that both countries bias their consumption
towards Country 1 varieties. As the top-right panel illustrates, the consumption of foreign varieties
increases in Country 2 but falls in Country 1. Of course, we see the opposite effect on domestic
varieties although the adjustments are smaller. Ultimately, agents in both countries consume less
varieties, which increases the price index in both countries, although by more in Country 2 (see the
bottom-left panel). Real income falls in Country 1, both per capita and in aggregate, because of
this increase in the price index. In contrast, in Country 2, real income per capita rises, because the
wage increases by more than the price index. Nevertheless, aggregate real income falls as result of
the reduction in labor supply from deaths (bottom-right panel).
5 Behavioral Responses
Up to this point, we have assumed that agents do not change their behavior during the pandemic,
unless changes in relative wages induce them to do so. Implicitly, we were assuming that although
households may observe that other households are dying, they do not understand the underlying
cause of those deaths and go on with their lives.
In this section, we instead consider the more realistic (but also more complicated) case in
which households realize that the deaths they observe are related to the outbreak of a pandemic.
Following the approach in Farboodi et al. (2020), we continue to assume, however, that all infected
individuals are asymptomatic, in the sense that household behavior is independent of their specific
health status, though their actual behavior is shaped by their expectation of the probability with
which they are susceptible, infected, or recovered households. How is that expectation formed? A
natural assumption is that agents have rational expectations and that their belief of the probability
with which they have a specific health status is equal to the share of the population in their country
with that particular health status.21
We denote the individual beliefs of the probability of being infected, susceptible recovered or
dead with lowercase letters, except for their belief of their death rate, which we denote by ki (t)
(instead of di (t)) to avoid a confusion with the notation we used for distance. The maximization
21This may raise the question among some readers as to how households are able to form this belief if, according to
our assumptions, nobody observes their own health status. It suffices to assume, however, that agents have common
knowledge of all parameters of the model, and form rational expectations of the path of the pandemic. For the latter,
it suffices to assume that agents observe pandemic-related deaths at the outbreak of the disease. More specifically,
at t = 0, notice from equation (31) that (i) Ii0 can be obtained from Ii0 = D0ηi since D−1 ' 0; (ii) Ri0 ' 0; and (iii)
Sit is then trivially Si0 = 1− Ii0 −Ri0 −Di0. With this initial condition, agents can solve for the future path of the
pandemic using rational expectations.
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problem of the individual, for known ii (0) , si (0) and ki (0) = 0, is given by
W si (0) = maxnii(·),nij(·)
∫∞
0 e
−ξt [[Qi (nii (t) , nij (t))− Ci (nii (t) , nij (t))] (1− ki (t))] dt
s.t. ṡi (t) = −si (t)
[
(αinii (t) + αin
∗
ii (t)) Ii (t) +
(







i̇i (t) = si (t)
[
(αinii (t) + αin
∗
ii (t)) Ii (t) +
(






− (γi + ηi) ii (t) ,
k̇i (t) = ηiii (t) ,
where ξ is the rate of time preference, and where from equation (6),
















ρ × (nij (t))φ .
Notice that we denote with an asterisk variables chosen by other households that affect the dynamics
of infection of a given household.22 In equilibrium, aggregate consistency implies that ii (t) = Ii (t),
si (t) = Si (t), and ki (t) = Di (t) . Implicitly, we are assuming that agents decide their optimal path
of nii (·) and nij(·) at period zero and commit to following it. Otherwise, without commitment, at
some future period and conditional on being alive, agents would want to reoptimize their choices
by solving the problem above but setting ki (t) = 0.
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The Hamiltonian of the problem faced by each household is given by
H(s, i, nii, nij , θ
i, θs, θk)
= [Qi (nii (t) , nij (t))− Ci (nii (t) , nij (t))] (1− ki (t))e−ξt
−θsi (t) si (t)
[
(αinii (t) + αin
∗
ii (t)) Ii (t) +
(










(αinii (t) + αin
∗
ii (t)) Ii (t) +
(






− (γi + ηi) ii (t)
]
+θki (t) ηiii (t) .
Hence, the optimality condition with respect to the choice of nij is[
∂Qi (nii (t) , nij (t))
∂nij (t)
− ∂Ci (nii (t) , nij (t))
∂nij (t)
]
(1− ki (t))e−ξt =
[
θsi (t)− θii (t)
]
si (t)αjIj (t) , (32)
22For instance, though the aggregate domestic rate of contact in i is 2αinii, a household has no control over how
many buyers visit the household’s seller, so the household only controls the rate αinii of contacts generated by the
household’s buyer.
23The reason for this is that the probability of deaths acts like non-exponential discounting in the value function
solved by agents, and it is well-understood that non-exponential discounting creates a wedge between the solution of
dynamic problems with and without commitment. Farboodi et al. (2020) bypass this issue by assuming that, instead
of foregoing future utility when dying, agents pay a one-time utility cost (or value of life) at the moment they die.
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while the optimality conditions associated with the co-state variables are given by:
−θ̇si (t) = −
[
θsi (t)− θii (t)
] [
(αinii (t) + αin
∗
ii (t)) Ii (t) +
(







−θ̇ii (t) = ηiθki (t)− (γi + ηi) θii (t) , (34)
−θ̇ki (t) = − [Qi (nii (t) , nij (t))− Ci (nii (t) , nij (t))] e−ξt. (35)
Finally, the transversality conditions are
lim
t→∞
θii (t) ii (t) = 0,
lim
t→∞
θsi (t) si (t) = 0,
lim
t→∞
θki (t) ki (t) = 0.
To complete the description of the model, we need to specify the general equilibrium determi-
nation of wages. As in the version of our model with deaths in Section 4, we again have that wages
are determined by the following goods market clearing condition:∑
j∈J
πji (w,t)× wj (t)× (1−Dj (t))Lj = wi (t)× (1−Di (t))× Li.
Importantly, however, the trade shares πji (w,t) are now impacted by the fact that the level of
interactions nij (t) are directly affected by the dynamics of the pandemic. Still, computationally,
it is straightforward to solve for a dynamic equilibrium in which πij (w,t) = Xij (t) /
∑
`∈J Xi` (t),
and Xij (t) = nij (t) pij (t) qij (t) (1−Di (t))Li. More specifically, the dynamic model can be solved
through a backward shooting algorithm (see Appendix E for details).
This is obviously a rather complicated system characterized by several differential equations, and
two (static) optimality conditions for the choices of nii and nij in each country. Nevertheless, we are
able to show analytically that the solution to this problem necessarily involves individual-level social
distancing. In the absence of a pandemic, households equate the marginal utility from sourcing
varieties from each location to the marginal cost of sourcing those varieties. During a pandemic,
households internalize that the interactions involved in sourcing varieties expose them to infection,
which leads them to reduce interactions until the marginal utility from those interactions exceeds
the marginal cost, as summarized in the following proposition (proven in Appendix A.9).
Proposition 9 Along the transition path, θsi (t)− θii (t) ≥ 0 for all t, which implies:
∂Qi (nii (t) , nij (t))
∂nij (t)
>
∂Ci (nii (t) , nij (t))
∂nij (t)
, as long as Ij (t) > 0.
An implication of this result is that the pandemic generically has a larger impact on foreign
interactions than on domestic interactions. This implication can been seen by re-arranging the
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where the term on the left-hand side is the marginal utility from interactions; the first term on the
right-hand side is the marginal cost of interactions; and the second term on the right-hand side
is the wedge capturing the threat of infection. As foreign interactions are generically a smaller
share of the consumption index than domestic interactions, the fraction on the left-hand side is
generically smaller for foreign interactions (i 6= j). Therefore, as a pandemic emerges and the threat
of infection becomes positive, a larger reduction in nij is generically needed for foreign interactions,
in order to raise the marginal utility on the left-hand side until it is equal to the marginal cost plus
the positive wedge capturing the threat of infections on the right-hand side.
We now illustrate some of these implications of behavioral responses for the case of symmetric
countries. We use the baseline parameters with αi = 0.1, γi + ηi = 0.2, and ηi/ (ηi + γi) = 0.0062
(a 0.62% death rate among those infected) for all i. We also show a specification with half the
death rate of ηi/ (ηi + γi) = 0.003 for all i, as well as the case without behavioral responses from
the previous section. As we choose the wage in one country as the numéraire, with symmetric
countries, the relative wage is also equal to one and constant over time. In the absence of any
behavioral responses, this constant relative wage implies that both the mass of varieties and price
index are constant over time, as shown in the Proof of Proposition A.4. In contrast, in the presence
of behavioral responses, households reduce the intensity of their interactions in response to the
threat of infection, which leads to changes in the mass of varieties and the price index over time.
In the top-left panel of Figure 8, we show the percentage of individuals infected in Country
2 for all three specifications (with symmetry the figure for Country 1 is identical). Households’
behavioral response of reducing interactions leads to a “flattening of the curve of the pandemic,”
such that the pandemic has lower peak and lower cumulative infections, but takes longer to subside.
Clearly, the larger the death rate, the stronger the behavioral response and the flatter the resulting
curve of infections. The top-right panel in Figure 8 presents the resulting evolution of cumulative
deaths in Country 2. Behavioral responses delay and reduce total deaths, with the level (and
proportional reduction) larger, the larger the death rate. Naturally, the behavioral response and
the associated reductions in the number of deaths come at an economic cost for survivors. As the
bottom-left panel shows, the reductions in the number of purchased domestic and foreign varieties
increase the price index in each country, which results in a corresponding decline in real income.
This increase in the price index, and reduction in real income, is larger the stronger the behavioral
response, and hence increases with the death rate. Finally, the bottom-right panel displays the
trade over GDP ratio (calculated as imports plus exports over GDP). In the example, trade/GDP
falls from about 0.45 to less than 0.25 when the death rate is 0.3%, and to 0.17 when the death
rate is 0.62%. Therefore, the flattening of the curve of infections and reduction in the number
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of deaths comes at the cost of lower trade and real income. Of course, behavioral responses are
ex-ante privately optimal, so it is not surprising that they improve individual welfare.24
Figure 8: Behavioural Responses with Symmetric Countries for Various Death Rates
The presence of behavioral responses in the model thus leads to endogenous social distancing
that has both economic and epidemiological implications. Households keep reducing interactions
until the (monotonically decreasing) reproduction number, R0 × Si (t), falls below 1. Once this
reproduction number crosses that threshold, interactions start growing again, as herd immunity
reduces the number of infections. An implication is that the magnitude of households’ behavioral
responses depends crucially on the value of R0. The larger this value, the larger the resulting
behavioral response. Furthermore, the model with behavioral responses results in reproduction
numbers that linger closer to one as economic activity endogenously recovers, once the worst of the
24It is worth stressing that these responses are not necessarily socially optimal due to the externalities that agents
exert on other agents when traveling.
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pandemic has passed.
The value of mobility and trade frictions plays an important role in shaping the magnitude
and pattern of behavioral responses. First, with symmetric countries, higher mobility and trade
frictions imply a reduction in the overall volume of human interactions, which leaves less scope for
behavioral responses. Second, higher mobility and trade frictions imply that more of the burden of
adjustment falls on domestic rather than foreign transactions. In Figure 9, we show the evolution
of the trade/GDP ratios for symmetric countries for two different levels of mobility (left panel)
and trade (right panel) frictions and the baseline values of our other parameters. As discussed
above, in the symmetric case without behavioral responses, all human contacts nii (t) and nij (t)
are constant in time, which implies that mobility and trade frictions only reduce the level of the
trade/GDP ratios. Once we incorporate behavioral responses, trade/GDP follows the trajectory
of the pandemic. The larger value of trade frictions reduces trade openness, which dampens the
absolute magnitude of the behavioral response, although trade openness can end up falling to quite
low levels. In this example with 10% trade frictions, (t12 = t21 = 1.1), trade essentially falls to zero
in the most severe phase of the pandemic. For each level of trade frictions, behavioral responses
reduce the total number of deaths, and for the parameter values considered here, higher trade and
mobility frictions also reduce the total number of deaths.
Figure 9: The Effect of Mobility and Trade Frictions on Trade/GDP with Behavioural Responses
We next illustrate some of the implications of our model when countries are asymmetric. We
focus on a case in which countries differ in their mortality rate, where remember that we assume
that mortality is determined by the country in which a household lives rather than the country
in which it was infected. We let Country 1 have a relatively low mortality rate of 0.3% and we
leave the mortality rate of Country 2 at the higher baseline value of 0.62%. Figure 10 presents
the results. The top-left panel shows the percent of infections in each country. As benchmarks, we
also display the average of infections in the two countries, as well as infections in the case of two
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symmetric countries with an average mortality rate of 0.46% (the mean of 0.3 and 0.62%). There
is a stronger behavioral response in the high-mortality Country 2 because households internalize
the greater risk that infection leads to death, which results in a “flatter” curve of infections in this
country. The low-mortality Country 1 ends up with about 10% higher total infections, because
of its more subdued behavioral response. However, its lower mortality rate implies that it ends
up with only about half the total number of deaths. This asymmetric behavioral response implies
that Country 1 is a relatively dangerous destination for doing business in the early stages of the
pandemic, but a relatively safe destination in the later stages of the pandemic, since it reaches herd
immunity faster. Comparing the average response for the world with asymmetric countries to the
response in the symmetric case with average mortality rates illustrates the implied aggregate effects
from differences across countries in mortality rates. In the asymmetric case, the world’s infection
curve is marginally flatter than in a symmetric world with average mortality rates.
The top-right panel in Figure 10 displays Country 1’s relative wage. As a result of the smaller
behavioral response in this lower mortality country, there is a greater risk of infection in Country 1
in the early stages of the pandemic, which leads to a decline in demand for this country’s varieties
and a fall in its relative wage. Once Country 1’s infection rate falls, demand for its varieties recovers,
and hence so does its wage. Eventually, once Country 1’s infection rate falls below that of Country
2, it becomes the relatively safe environment in which to source varieties, and its relative wage rises
temporarily above one, before falling back to one as the pandemic ends. Therefore, these behavioral
responses in general equilibrium with asymmetric countries lead to demand effects that reduce the
relative wage of the country with a relatively higher infection rate. In addition, as shown in the
previous section, there is another general equilibrium effect from changes in relative labor supply.
A country with a higher death rate experiences a reduction in its relative labor supply, which leads
to an increase in its relative wage. The top-right panel of Figure 10 shows the balance of these
forces, and demonstrates that relative demand effects generally dominates and overturns the result
in Section 4 linking higher death rates to higher relative wages.
As before, the stronger behavioral response in Country 2 as a result of its higher mortality rate
comes with greater economic costs. Country 2’s reduction in domestic and foreign purchases raises
its price index and reduces its real income. The effect on the price index in Country 1 is more
nuanced. Country 1 also reduces domestic and foreign interactions, which tends to increase its price
index. However, the decline in its relative wage during the first part of the pandemic reduces the
price of domestic varieties. The bottom-left panel in Figure 10 shows how these forces result in a
price index with multiple peaks. Overall, the effect of the pandemic on the real income of Country
1 is negative but substantially smaller in magnitude than in Country 2. As shown in the bottom-
right panel, the reduction in human interactions from social distancing reduces trade openness
dramatically, particularly in Country 2, where behavioral responses are stronger. The asymmetry
in mortality rates between the two countries initially leads to a larger reduction in trade openness
than in a symmetric world with average mortality rates, in part because the behavioral response
of Country 2 is particularly strong in the earlier phases of the pandemic. Later in the pandemic,
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Figure 10: Behavioural Responses with Asymmetric Mortality Rates
the asymmetric case has higher trade openness than in a symmetric world, because the initially
subdued behavioral response of Country 1 creates a more pronounced and faster wave of infections.
Adjustment Costs and the Risk of a Pandemic
Despite the potential for significant disruptions in international trade during a pandemic, a clear
implication of the first-order condition (32) is that as long as Ii (t) = Ij (t) = 0, human interactions
are at the same level as in a world without the potential for pandemics. In other words, although we
have generated rich dynamics of international trade during a pandemic, as soon as this pandemic is
overcome (via herd immunity or the arrival of a vaccine), our model predicts that life immediately
goes back to normal. We next explore an extension of our model that explores the robustness of
this notion of a rapid V-shape recovery in economic activity and international trade flows after a
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global pandemic.
The main novel feature we introduce is adjustment costs associated with changes in the measures
of human contacts nii (t) and nij (t). More specifically, we assume that whenever a household wants
to change the measure of contacts nij (t), it needs to pay a cost ψ1 |ṅij(t)|ψ2 , where ψ1 > 0 and
ψ2 > 1. An analogous adjustment cost function applies to changes in domestic interactions nii.
Notice that this formulation assumes that the cost of reducing or increasing the number of contacts
are symmetric. This leads to the following modified first-order condition for the choice of nij at




∂Qi (nii (t) , nij (t))
∂nij









θsi (t0)− θii (t0)
]
si (t0) ajIj (t0) dt+ e
−ξt0ψ1ψ2 |ṅij(t0)|ψ2−1 (1− ki (t0)).
Since dead individuals do not pay adjustment costs, equation (35) becomes
−θ̇ki (t) = −
[
Qi (nii (t) , nij (t))− Ci (nii (t) , nij (t))− ψ1(|ṅii(t)|ψ2 + |ṅij(t)|ψ2)
]
e−ξt.
The rest of the system is as before with the added feature that the values of nii (t) and nij (t) are
now state variables, with exogenous initial conditions nii (0) and nij (0).
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As the first-order condition makes evident, the choice of ṅij(t0) now affects the values of nii (t)
and nij (t) in the future directly and not only through its impact on the pandemic (and the cor-
responding co-state variables θsi (t0) and θ
i
i (t0)). This has two important implications. First,
adjustment costs imply that agents will react less aggressively to a pandemic and overall their reac-
tion will be smoother. Of course, the counterpart is that their endogenous response will attenuate
the flattening of the curve of infections associated with behavioral responses. Second, if households
anticipate that the probability of a future pandemic is λ > 0, the growth in the resurgence of
human interactions will be slower than in the world in which the perceived probability of a future
pandemic is 0, and the more so the larger is λ. As a result, if due to recency effects, households
perceive a particularly high risk of future pandemics in the aftermath of a pandemic, this could
slow the recovery of international trade flows after a pandemic occurs.
Figure 11 presents a numerical example of an economy with symmetric countries, behavioral
responses, and adjustment costs. The figure uses the baseline parameters from the previous section
for symmetric countries, together with ψ1 = 1 and ψ2 = 4 for the adjustment cost parameters.
The left-panel shows the evolution of foreign varieties consumed, nij (t), and compares it with the
case with no adjustment costs (ψ1 = 0). Clearly, adjustment costs reduce the magnitude of the
behavioral response. Not only do agents take longer to start the adjustment, but the adjustment is
substantially smaller. In computing this example we assume that the pandemic never repeats itself.
Hence, eventually the number of varieties consumed is the same as in the behavioral case without
25Alternatively we can use terminal conditions. This is what we do in the numerical exercise below where we
assume that a pandemic ends, and never happens again, after some large time period T.
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adjustment costs. We use this value as the terminal condition and compare the resulting initial
nij(1). Anticipatory effects, agents adjusting in anticipation of a pandemic, imply that the initial
value should be smaller than the terminal one. Figure 11 shows no indication that these effects
are significant. Although nij (1) < nij (T ) , the effect is negligible and cannot be perceived in the
graph. This is the case, even though the effect on the evolution of domestic and foreign contacts is
fairly large. This pattern of results is consistent with the view that economies will quickly return to
normal after the pandemic, although with the caveat that we have here assumed that adjustment
costs are symmetric and that the pandemic does not affect agents’ beliefs of the probability of future
pandemics. The right panel of Figure 11 presents the corresponding evolution of infections with
and without adjustment costs. As discussed above, the milder and delayed behavioral response in
the case with adjustment costs leads to a faster increase in the number of infections. It also leads to
a corresponding faster decline, since herd immunity starts reducing the number of infections earlier.
The result is a faster, but more severe, pandemic with more overall deaths, but less pronounced
temporary reductions in real income and trade.
Figure 11: Behavioural Responses with Adjustment Costs
6 Conclusions
Although globalization brings aggregate economic gains, it is often argued that it also makes soci-
eties more vulnerable to disease contagion. In this paper, we develop a model of human interaction
to analyze the relationship between globalization and pandemics. We jointly microfound both
the canonical model of international trade from economics (the gravity equation) with the semi-
nal model pandemics from epidemiology (the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model) using
a theory of human interaction. Through jointly modelling these two phenomena, we highlight a
number of interactions between them. On the one hand, the contact rate among individuals, which
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is a central parameter in benchmark epidemiology models, is endogenous in our framework, and
responds to both economic forces (e.g., the gains from international trade) and to the dynamics of
the pandemic (e.g., the perceived health risk associated with international travel). On the other
hand, we study how the emergence of a pandemic and the perceived risk of future outbreaks shapes
the dynamics of international trade, and the net gains from international trade once the death toll
from the pandemic is taken into account.
We begin by considering the case in which the disease does not affect the ability of agents to
produce and trade, and agents are unaware of the threat of infection, which implies that they do
not have an incentive to alter their individual behavior. Even in this case, globalization influences
the dynamics of the disease, because it changes patterns of human interaction. We show that
there are cross-country epidemiological externalities, such that whether a pandemic occurs in the
open economy depends critically on the disease environment in the country with the highest rate
of domestic infection. If countries are symmetric, a decline in any (symmetric) international trade
friction also leads to an overall increase in the total number of human interactions (domestic plus
foreign), which increases the range of parameters where a pandemic occurs. In this case, even if an
epidemic would not be self-sustaining in a country in the closed economy, it can be self-sustaining
in an open economy. In contrast, if countries are sufficiently different from one another in terms of
their primitive epidemiological parameters (e.g., as a result of different health policies), a decline in
any international trade friction can have the opposite effect of decreasing the range of parameters
where a pandemic occurs. In this case where one country has a much worse disease environment
than the other, trade liberalization can reduce the share of that country’s interactions that occur
in this bad disease environment, thereby taking the global economy below the threshold for a
pandemic to be self-sustaining. In the presence of differences in the timing of infections, multiple
waves of infection can occur in the open economy, when there would be a single wave in the closed
economy.
We next allow the infection to cause deaths (or reduce productivity in the labor market),
but assume that agents remain unaware of the threat of infection, and hence continue to have no
incentive to alter their individual behavior. In this case, a country with a worse disease environment
experiences a larger reduction in labor supply, which in turn leads to an increase in its relative
wage. This wage increase reduces the share of interactions that occur in that country’s bad disease
environment and increases the share that occur in better disease environments, which again can
take the global economy below the threshold for a pandemic to be self-sustaining. Therefore, the
general equilibrium effects of the pandemic on wages and trade patterns induce a form of “general
equilibrium social distancing” from bad disease environments that operates even in the absence of
purposeful social distancing motivated by health risks.
We then allow individuals to become aware of the threat of infections and optimally adjust
their behavior depending on the observed state of the pandemic. In this case, agents are not willing
to interact as much with the unhealthy country thereby decreasing its relative wage. Overall, we
find that behavioral responses lead to amplified reductions in international trade and income, but
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save lives. Adding adjustment costs of establishing the human interactions needed to sustain trade
delays and diminishes these behavioral responses.
Although we have argued that our results are robust to alternative specifications of our model
of international trade, our theoretical framework is still missing a number or realistic features. For
example, in future work it would be interesting to explore the implications of allowing for cross-
sectoral heterogeneity in the importance of face-to-face interactions for sustaining international
trade. Similarly, and although we have studied the effects of various parameters that are at least
partly shaped by government policies, it would be fruitful to more thoroughly study optimal policy
in our framework. We leave these extensions for future work.
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A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Second-Order Conditions for Choice of nij























































































Notice that ∂W (i)
∂(nij)












< (φ− 1) ,
so this condition could be violated for large enough τij , unless σ > 2, in which case the condition

























































− (φ− 1) cµij (dij)ρ × (nij)φ−2

= Ξ2 − κiij − κ
j
ij +$ij ,
where κiij < 0 and κ
j
ij < 0, and $ij > 0, whenever σ > 2 and φ > 1.












and the second-order conditions are met.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of part a):
From equation (7), we can write





























This implies that, in order to study the effect of international trade frictions on nii (w), it suffices










it is clear that the impact effect of a lower Γi` is to decrease πii and thus to decrease nii. To take



























where ω ≡ wj/wi is the relative wage in country j. From this equation, it is easy to see that if
Γij falls, ω cannot possibly decrease. If it did, both terms in the left-hand-side of (A.1) would fall.
But if ω goes up, then πii goes up by more than as implied by the direct fall in Γij . Similarly, if
Γji falls, πij falls on impact, so ω needs to increase to re-equilibrate the labor market, and again
πii must decline.
Because the results above hold for Γij and Γji, they must hold for any of the constituents of
those composite parameters.
Proof of part b):






ρ × (nij)φ =
1




In part a) of the proof, we have established that when any international trade friction decreases, πii
goes down, and from (13), wi/Pi goes up. Thus, µii (dii)
ρ× (nii)φ+µij (dij)ρ× (nij)φ goes up when
any international trade friction decreases. But because nii goes down and µij and dij (weakly) go
down, it must be the case that nij increases.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by considering the case with general country asymmetries. Consider the sum
µii (dii)
ρ × (nii)φ + µij (dij)ρ × (nij)φ .
Differentiating:
φ
µii (dii)ρ × (nii)φ−1 dnii︸︷︷︸
<0
+ µij (dij)
ρ × (nij)φ−1 dnij
+ d (µij (dij)ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
× (nij)φ > 0. (A.2)
Clearly, we must have
µii (dii)




φ−1 > µij (dij)




which would prove the Proposition.









































This amounts to prices for domestic varieties being lower than prices for foreign varieties. This
makes sense, in such a case, desired quantities of domestic varieties will be higher, and the marginal
benefit of getting more of them will be higher.
Note finally that with full symmetry, we must have wi = wj and Zj = Zi, and the condition
above trivially holds since tij > tii and dij > dii.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4









































































































which is negative if a− dg > 0. But here we have
a− dg = σ − 1
(φ− 1)
− φ (σ − 1)
φ− 1
σ − 2
φ (σ − 1)− 1
=
σ − 1
φ (σ − 1)− 1
> 0.
In sum, nij decreases in ω. Because an increase in Li/Lj increases in ω (from straightforward use





























and by an analogous argument above, we have that nji increases in ω, and thus an increase in
population in i leads to an increase nji (while also decreasing njj).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
See main text and Online Appendix D. Here we just discuss the derivation of the system of equations
in (23)-(24), and derive the comparative statics mentioned in the main text.
We begin with the law of motion for susceptible agents in each country in equation (16):
Ṡi = −2αinii × Si × Ii − αjnij × Si × Ij − αinji × Si × Ij
Ṡj = −2αjnjj × Sj × Ij − αjnij × Sj × Ii − αinji × Sj × Ii



















Turning the growth rate in the left-hand-side to a log-difference, and integrating we get














Finally, noting Si (0) ' 1 and Ri (0) ' 1, and Ri (∞) = 1 − Si (∞) (since Ii (∞) = 0), we obtain
the system in (23)-(24), that is:














Although we cannot solve the system in closed-form, we can derive some comparative statics. In












































dSi (∞) = −
































dSj (∞) = −

































Next, note that because new infections eventually go to zero, there have to be (at least) two
peaks of infection (t∗i and t
∗
j ) defined by İi (t
∗




= 0. Whenever there are more than two
peaks in one country, should set t∗i and t
∗
j to the latest periods for which İi (t
∗





Now we have two cases to consider:





























































But at Si (t
∗
i ) > Si (∞) and Sj (t∗i ) > Si (∞) , so we must have
2αinii
γi
Si (∞) ≤ 1 and
2αjnjj
γj










































































































> Si (∞) , so we must again have 2αiniiγi Si (∞) ≤ 1 and
2αjnjj
γj
















Going back to the system, this means that an increase in any n or a decrease in any γ will
decrease the steady-state values for Si (∞) and Sj (∞), and thus increase infections everywhere.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
See main text. In particular, the result is an immediate corollary of Proposition 3.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
See main text.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8



























ω (1−Dj)Lj − (1−Di)Li
 = 0.










Therefore, from the implicit function theorem, we have the following comparative statics of the











We now combine these results above with the comparative statics of bilateral interactions with
respect to the relative wage (ω) from Proposition 4. In particular, from the proof of that proposition,


















































A.9 Proof of Proposition 9
Because Qi (nii (t) , nij (t)) ≥ Ci (nii (t) , nij (t)), from equation (35), we must have θ̇ki (t) ≥ 0 at all
t. This in turn implies that we must have θki (t) ≤ 0 at all t for the transversality condition to be
met (i.e., convergence to 0 from below).
We next show that θ̇ii (t) ≥ 0 and θii (t) ≤ 0 for all t. First note that we must have
ηiθ
k
i (t) < (γi + ηi) θ
i
i (t)
and thus (from equation (34)) θ̇ii (t) > 0 for all t. To see this, note that if instead we had
ηiθ
k
i (t0) > (γi + ηi) θ
i
i (t0) ,
at any time t0, then θ̇
i
i (t0) < 0 < θ̇
i
k (t0) so this inequality would continue to hold for all t0 > t.
But then we would have θ̇ii (t) < 0 for all t > t0, and for θ
i
i (t) to meet its transversality condition,
we would need to have θii (t) > 0 at all t > t0. But if θ
i
i (t) > 0 and θ
k
i (t) ≤ 0 for t > t0, it is clear
from equation (34) that θ̇ii (t) > 0 for t > t0, which is a contradiction. In sum, θ̇
i
i (t) > 0 for all t.
But then for θii (t) to meet its transversality condition (from below), we need θ
i
i (t) ≤ 0 for all t.
Finally, to show that show that θsi (t) > θ
i
i (t) for all t, suppose that θ
s
i (t0) < θ
i
i (t0) for some
t0. From equation (33), this would imply θ̇
s
i (t0) < 0. But because θ̇
i
i (t) > 0 for all t, we would
continue to have θsi (t) < θ
i
i (t) for all t > t0, and thus θ̇
s
i (t) < 0 for all t > t0. This would imply
that, for t > t0, θ
s
i (t) would converge to its steady-state value of 0 from above, i.e., θ
s
i (t) > 0 for
t > t0. But because θ
i
i (t) ≤ 0 for all t, from equation (33), we would have θ̇si (t) > 0 for t > t0,
which is a contradiction. In sum, we must have θsi (t) > θ
i
i (t) for all t.
B Simulation Appendix
In this section of the Appendix, we discuss our choice of parameter values. A description of the
computational algorithms used is presented in Appendix E. The simulation presented in the main
text are supposed to be illustrative rather than a detailed calibration for a specific circumstance.
Nevertheless, the baseline calibration adopts the central values of the epidemiology parameters in
Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020). For example, in Figure 1 we set the value of the exogenous
component of the infection rate in the healthy country, α1 = 0.04, and we vary the value for the
sick country between α2 ∈ [0.04, 0.1]. Using the equilibrium values of interactions, this leads to
a value of 2niiαi + nijαj + njiαi (the actual infection rate in Country i if Ii = Ij) in the range
[0.15, 0.20] in Country 1 and [0.15, 0.33] in Country 2, well in the range of values estimated in
Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020). We also set γi = 0.2, which implies an infectious period of
5 days.
The economic model also involves a number of parameters. We set the elasticity of substitution
σ = 5, a central value in the trade literature (Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare, 2015), and normalize
productivity Zi = 1 for all i. We also set Country size Li = 3 when countries are symmetric. We
choose values so that the choice of trading partners nij is never constrained. We choose a baseline
53
value for the elasticity of the cost of consuming more varieties in a region of φ = 2. Hence, the
second order conditions discussed in the text are satisfied since φ > 1/(σ − 1). Note that we also
require φ > 1. We eliminate all man-made frictions in the baseline, so tij = µij = 1 for all i, j, and
let dij = 1.1 for i 6= j and 1 otherwise. We set to one the elasticity of trade costs with respect
to distance, so δ = 1. Finally we set the level of the cost of creating contacts, c = 0.15, which
guarantees that equilibrium contacts are always in an interior solution. Of course, in the main
text we show a number of exercises in which we change these parameter values, and in particular
introduce trade and mobility frictions. Whenever we vary from the parameter values mentioned
above we state that in the discussion of the relevant graph.
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Globalization and Pandemics
Pol Antràs, Stephen J. Redding, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
1
C Extensions of Economic Model
In this Appendix, we flesh out some of the details of the four extensions of our framework mentioned
in Section 2.3 of the main text.
C.1 Traveling Costs in Terms of Labor
If traveling costs are specified in terms of labor (rather than utility), welfare at the household level



























































The first-order condition for the choice of nij delivers:




















Bilateral import flows by country i from country j are given by






































































which is identical to equation (9) applying to our baseline model with traveling costs in terms of
labor.
The price index is in turn given by





























just as in equation (15) of the main text.
Plugging this expression back into the budget constraint yields
Ii =
φ(σ − 1)
φ(σ − 1) + 1
wi,



















which is only slightly different than expression (11) in the main text,
The labor-market conditions are given by
πiiIiLi + πjiIjLj = IiLi
or, equivalently,
πiiwiLi + πjiwjLj = wiLi,
just as in the main text, and remember that the expressions for πii and πji are also left unchanged.
We next turn to verifying that Propositions 1 through 4 in the main text continue to hold
whenever travel costs in equation (1) are specified in terms of labor rather than being modelled as
3
a utility cost.
Proposition 1’: As long as trade frictions ( Γij) are bounded, there exists a unique vector of
equilibrium wages w∗ = (wi, wj) ∈ R2++ that solves the system of equations above.
Proof. By results in standard gravity models in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Allen and Arkolakis
(2014), and Allen et al. (2020).
Proposition 2’: A decline in any international trade or mobility friction (dij , tij , tji, µij , µji) leads
to: (a) a decline in the rates (nii and njj) at which individuals will meet individuals in their
own country; and (b) an increase in the rates at which individuals will meet individuals from
the other country (nij and nji).
Proof. (a) Given that Ii = φ(σ−1)φ(σ−1)+1wi,































φ(σ − 1) + 1
) 1
φ(σ−1)








where ω = wj/wi is the relative wage in country j .







































Consider a case when Γij decreases, while other Γkl remain constant. That means that the first
term in the sum goes down, while the second term is constant. For the equality to hold, ω should
increase. After re-equilibration, the second term in the sum increased, which means that the first
term decreased. This means that Pi/wi decreased, and nii as well.
Consider now a case when Γji decreases, while other Γkl remain constant. The second term
increases, so ω needs to go down to equilibrate the model. That means that the first term decreases,
and Pi/wi and nii decrease by extension.
Therefore, whenever one decreases any international friction (dij , tij , tji, µij , µji), Γij or Γji goes













Since Ii = φ(σ−1)φ(σ−1)+1)wi, the left-hand side is constant. Since nii and njj decrease, nij and nji must
increase.
4
Proposition 3’: Suppose that countries are symmetric, in the sense that Li = L, Zi = Z, and
Γij = Γ for all i. Then a decline in any (symmetric) international trade frictions leads to an
overall increase in human interactions (ndom + nfor) experienced by both household buyers
and household sellers.


















































ij , then dnij > −dnii.



































ij is satisfied if and only if pii < pij .
When countries are symmetric, this holds trivially because of international trade costs tij > tii
and dij > dii. Hence, dnij > −dnii, and ndom + nfor increases.
Proposition 4’: An increase in the relative size of country i’s population leads to an increase in
the rate nii at which individuals from i will meet individuals in their own country, and to a
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) 1
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φ(σ − 1) + 1
,
nij decreases.
Therefore, following a growth in population Li, nii increases while nij decreases.
C.2 International Sourcing of Inputs
The assumption that households travel internationally to procure final goods may seem unrealistic.
Perhaps international travel is better thought as being a valuable input when firms need specialized
inputs and seek potential providers of those inputs in various countries. It is straightforward to
re-interpret our model along those lines. In particular, suppose now that all households in country
i produce a homogeneous final good but also produce differentiated intermediate input varieties.
The household’s final good is produced combining a bundle of the intermediate inputs produced











and this final good is not traded (this is without loss of generality if households are homogeneous
in each country and trade costs for final goods are large enough). Household welfare is linear in
consumption of the final good and is reduced by the disutility cost of a household’s member having





















Under this model is isomorphic to the one above, except that trade will be in intermediate inputs
rather than in final goods.
C.3 Multi-Country Model
We next consider a version of our model with a world economy featuring multiple countries. It
should be clear that all our equilibrium conditions, except for the labor-market clearing condition
(14) apply to that multi-country environment once the set of countries J is redefined to include
6
multiple countries. The labor-market condition is in turn simply given by∑
j∈J
πij (w)wjLj = wiLi,
where πij (w) is defined in (9) for an arbitrary set of countries J . Similarly, the model is also
easily adaptable to the case in which there is a continuum of locations i ∈ Ω, where Ω is a closed
and bounded set of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. The equilibrium conditions are again
unaltered, with integrals replacing summation operators throughout.
From the results in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Allen and Arkolakis (2014), and Allen et al.
(2020), it is clear that Proposition 1 in the main text on existence and uniqueness will continue
to hold. In the presence of arbitrary asymmetries across countries, it is hard however to derive
crisp comparative static results of the type in Propositions 2 and 4. Nevertheless, our result in
Proposition 3 regarding the positive effect of declines of trade and mobility barriers on the overall
level of human interactions between symmetric countries is easily generalizable to the case of many
countries (details available upon request - future versions of the paper will include an Online
Appendix with the details).
C.4 Traveling Salesman Model
Finally, we explore a variant of our model in which it is the household’s seller rather than the
buyer who travels to other locations. We model this via a framework featuring scale economies,
monopolistic competition and fixed cost of exporting, as in the literature on selection into exporting
emanating from the seminal work of Melitz (2003), except that the fixed costs of selling are defined
at the buyer level rather than at the country level, as in the work of Arkolakis (2010).



























Household sellers in country j produce Nj varieties and make them available to nij consumers.
Both Nj and nij are endogenous and pinned down as part of the equilibrium. Note that because
there are Li and Lj households in i and j, respectively, the measure of varieties available from j
to consumers in i is given by ηij = nijNjLj/Li (where implicitly we assume that which nij < Lj
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consumers in j get access to a seller’s varieties is chosen at random).
The level of output and price of each variety, as well as the measure of consumers nij sellers

















where again nij is the number of customers served, and where the remaining parameters are anal-
ogous to those in our baseline model.



































Developing a new variety costs wif . Hence, by free entry,
∑
k Πki = wif , and the zero-profit























With this expression at hand, we can compute the import volume of country i from country j:






































































































































so the zero-profit condition implies
∑
k















= wif ⇒ Ni =
φ− 1
φσf
Hence, the number of varieties is constant and independent of many of the parameters of the model.
We finally turn to the general equilibrium of the model, which is associated with the condition:
πiiwiLi + πjiwjLj = wiLi
















































We are now ready to state and proof results analogous to those in Propositions 1 and 4 in the
main text.
Proposition 1”: As long as trade frictions (Γij) are bounded, there exists a unique vector of
equilibrium wages w∗ = (wi, wj) ∈ R2++ that solves the system of equations above.
Proof. This follows again from results in standard gravity models in Alvarez and Lucas (2007),
Allen and Arkolakis (2014), and Allen et al. (2020), and the fact that if there exists a unique wage
vector, the remaining equilibrium variables in this single-sector economy are uniquely determined.
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Proposition 2”: A decline in any international trade or mobility friction (dij , tij , tji, µij , µji) leads
to: (a) a decline in the rates (nii and njj) at which individuals will meet individuals in their
own country; and (b) an increase in the rates at which individuals will meet individuals from
the other country (nij and nji).



































where ω = wj/wi is the relative wage in country j .











































ωLj = Li (C.2)
Consider a case when Γij decreases, while other Γkl remain constant. That means that the first
term in the sum goes down, while the second term is constant. For the equality to hold, ω should
increase. After re-equilibration, the second term in the sum increased, which means that the first
term decreased. This means that Pi/wi decreased, and nii as well.
Consider now a case when Γji decreases, while other Γkl remain constant. The second term
increases, so ω needs to go down to equilibrate the model. That means that the first term decreases,
and Pi/wi and nii decrease by extension.
Therefore, whenever one decreases any international friction (dij , tij , tji, µij , µji), Γij or Γji goes
down, and, hence, nii and njj go down.


























Since nii and njj decrease and frictions do not increase, nij and nji have to increase.
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Proposition 3”: Suppose that countries are symmetric, in the sense that Li = L, Zi = Z, and
Γij = Γ for all i. Then a decline in any (symmetric) international trade frictions leads to an
overall increase in human interactions (ndom + nfor) experienced by both household buyers
and household sellers.
















































ji , then dnji > −dnii.



























Since the countries are symmetrics, Pi = Pj and wi = wj , so the inequality is satisied if and
only if pii < pji.
When countries are symmetric, this holds trivially because of international trade costs tji > tii
and dji > dii. Hence, dnji > −dnii, and ndom + nfor increases.
Proposition 4”: An increase in the relative size of country i’s population leads to an increase in
the rate nii at which individuals from i will meet individuals in their own country, and to a












































ωLj = Li (C.4)
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Therefore, following a growth in population Li, nii increases while nji decreases.
D Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5: Assume that there is trade between the two countries (i.e., αjnij + αinji > 0),
which implies that the next generation matrix FV −1 is irreducible. If R0 ≤ 1, the no-
pandemic equilibrium is the unique stable equilibrium. If R0 > 1, the no-pandemic equilibrium
is unstable, and there exists a unique stable endemic equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of existence and uniqueness, depending on whether R0 ≤ 1 or R0 > 1, follows
standard arguments for a two-group SIR model, as in Magal et al. (2016). We proceed in the
following steps. (A) The system of dynamic equations for susceptibles, infected and recovered is
given by:
Ṡi (t) = −2αiniiSi (t) Ii (t)− αjnijSi (t) Ij (t)− αinjiSi (t) Ij (t) , (D.1)
Ṡj (t) = −2αjnjjSj (t) Ij (t)− αinjiSj (t) Ii (t)− αjnijSj (t) Ii (t) , (D.2)
İi (t) = 2αiniiSi (t) Ii (t) + αjnijSi (t) Ij (t) + αinjiSi (t) Ij (t)− γiIi (t) , (D.3)
İj (t) = 2αjnjjSj (t) Ij (t) + αinjiSj (t) Ii (t) + αjnijSj (t) Ii (t)− γjIj (t) , (D.4)
Ṙi (t) = γiIi (t) , (D.5)
Ṙj (t) = γjIj (t) . (D.6)





















































which implies that the matrix B is irreducible for all strictly positive susceptibles Si (t) , Sj (t) > 0.


















Integrating from 0 to t, we have:






(Rj (t)−Rj (0)) ,






(Ri (t)−Ri (0)) .
Using the accounting identities, Si (t) + Ii (t) +Ri (t) = 1 and Sj (t) + Ij (t) +Rj (t) = 1, we obtain:
logSi (t)−logSi (0) =
2αinii
γi
[(Si (t) + Ii (t))− (Si (0) + Ii (0))]+
αjnij + αinji
γj
[(Sj (t) + Ij (t))− (Sj (0) + Ij (0))] ,
logSj (t)−lnSj (0) =
2αjnjj
γj
[(Sj (t) + Ij (t))− (Sj (0) + Ij (0))]+
αinji + αjnij
γi
[(Si (t) + Ii (t))− (Si (0) + Ii (0))] .
In steady-state as t→∞, we have Ii (∞) = Ij (∞) = 0, and hence:




[Si (∞)− Vi] +
αjnij + αinji
γj
[Sj (∞)− Vj ]
]
, (D.8)










where Vi ≡ Si (0) + Ii (0) and Vj (0) ≡ Sj (0) + Ij (0). We now define the following notation:
X ≤ Y ⇔ Xk ≤ Yk for all k ∈ {i, j} ,
X < Y ⇔ X ≤ Y and Xk < Yk for some k ∈ {i, j} ,
X  Y ⇔ Xk < Yk for all k ∈ {i, j} ,
and represent the system (D.8)-(D.9) as the following map:






















[xi − Vi] +
αjnij + αinji
γj
[xj − Vj ]
]
,




[xi − Vi] +
2αjnjj
γj
[xj − Vj ]
]
.
(C) Using this notation, we begin by establishing that all the fixed points of T in [0, S (0)] are
contained in the smaller interval [S−, S+]. To establish this result, note that T is monotone in
increasing, which implies that:
X ≤ Y ⇒ T (X) ≤ T (Y ) .






> 0, this implies:
X  Y T (X) T (Y ) .
For S (0) 0, and using the definitions of Vi and Vj above, this implies:
0 T (0) < T (S (0)) < S (0) .
Therefore, by induction arguments, we have the following result for each n ≥ 1:
0 T (0) · · ·  Tn (0) Tn+1 (0) ≤ Tn+1 (S (0)) < · · ·Tn (S (0)) < S (0) .
By taking the limit as n does to +∞, we obtain:
0 lim
n→+∞
Tn (0) =: S− ≤ S+ := lim
n→+∞
Tn (S (0)) < S (0) .










(D) We next establish that if S− < S+ then S−  S+. This property follows from our assump-
tion that the matrix B above is irreducible. Assume, for example, that S−i < S
+
i . Then, since
αinji+αjnij
γi











































































































































which establishes the result.
(F) We now show that the map T has at most two equilibria such that either:
(i) S− = S+ and T has only one equilibrium in [0, S (0)];
(ii) S−  S+ and the only equilibria of T in [0, S (0)] are S− and S+.
We prove this result by contradiction. Assume that S− 6= S+. Then S− < S+, which implies
S−  S+. Now suppose that there exists X̄ ∈ [S−, S+] a fixed point T such that:
S− 6= X̄ and X̄ 6= S+.
Then, by using the same arguments as in (D) above, we have:



















+ S− ≤ S+,


































































which contradicts the definition of gamma as the supremum of the set in equation (D.11), since
S− ≥ 0. Therefore we cannot have another fixed point X̄ ∈ [S−, S+] .
(G) Now consider the case where:
S−  S+.








































To prove this result, note that:






















































































































= 0, ξ− < 1,
where I is the identity matrix. Noting that the matrices DT (S+) and DT (S−) are non-negative














(I) We now solve explicitly for the spectral radius of the matrices DT (S±). We find the eigenvalues
of the matrix DT (S±) by solving the characteristic equation:



















































































(J) We now use the results in (H) and (I) to examine the local stability of the two steady-state
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Therefore the spectral radius of the matrix DT (S±) corresponds to the global R0 that determines
the local stability of the two steady-state equilibria. As we have shown that ρ (DT (S+)) > 1, the
steady-state S+ is locally unstable. As we have shown that ρ (DT (S−)) < 1, the steady-state S−
is locally stable.
E Computational Appendix
In this Appendix we describe the algorithms we use to do the numerical simulations in each section
of the paper.
E.1 A Two-Country SIR Model with Time-Invariant Interactions
Solution Algorithm
1. Compute the value of nii, nij , nij , and njj as the outcome of the equilibrium that solves












πiiwiLi + πjiwjLj = wiLi,






















corresponding to equation (9) in the paper. Call them n̄ii, n̄ij , n̄ij , and n̄jj . Provided
population, technology, and relative wages are time invariant, these quantities will be fixed.
2. Set Ii(0) = 0.1× 10−4, Si(0) = 1− Ii(0), and Ri(0) = 0 for all i. For each t ∈ [1, T ] solve the










−Ωi Ωi 0 0 0 0
0 −γi γi 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −Ωj Ωj 0
0 0 0 0 −γj γj






















Ωi = αi × 2n̄ii × Ii(t) + αj × n̄ij × Ij(t) + αi × n̄ji × Ij(t).
This system corresponds to equations (16)− (18) in the paper. The variable step marks the
number of steps taken within each time period, in this section we use step = 2.
Associated Figures
This section in the paper uses three sets of parameters. Figures 1, 2, and 3 present a general
specification in which international trade favors the onset of a pandemic, with standard parameters
as listed in Table E.1 for Figure 1 and Table E.2 for Figures 2 and 3. Figures 4 and 5 look at an
example in which free trade prevents the onset of a pandemic, using parameters listed in Table E.3.
Figure 6 presents the possibility of second waves of infection, using parameters listed in Table E.4.
If no other mention is made, trade frictions are set at baseline values µij = µji = 1, tij = tji = 1,
dij = dij = 1.1. Some of these figures study changes in trade frictions moving one of these
parameters. All other parameters are kept at baseline value.





L1, L2 3, 3
d12 = d21 1.1






γ1, γ2 0.20, 0.20
η1, η2 0.0, 0.0
In order to obtain the result described for the second set of parameters, φ = 1.5 is crucial.
The only other difference with respect to the general scenario is a decrease of c to 0.1. This is not
necessary: the qualitative result also holds for c = 0.15 but it was originally changed so that nii
would be approximately the same in both cases.
There are more parameters that will generate a second wave of infections. The ones presented
here were picked to obtain reasonable values for R0i and R0. What is essential for this feature to
occur is that both countries have different timings for their own pandemics in autarky. One (small)
country has very fast contagion rates (α) and very short recovery periods (high γ), while in the
other (big) country the disease must progress much slower so that when the cycle starts it will drag
the first country with it once again. The difference in size is there so that when the small country
goes through its first cycle, the big country will remain mostly unaffected.
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L1, L2 3, 3
d12 = d21 1.1




α1, α2 0.04, 0.07
γ1, γ2 0.20, 0.20
η1, η2 0.0, 0.0





L1, L2 3, 3
d12 = d21 1.1




α1, α2 0.04, 0.07
γ1, γ2 0.20, 0.20
η1, η2 0.0, 0.0
E.2 General-Equilibrium Induced Responses
Solution Algorithm
1. Compute the value of nii(0), nij(0), nij(0), and njj(0) as the outcome of the equilibrium that
solves












πiiwiLi(1−Di(t)) + πjiwjLj(1−Dj(t)) = wiLi(1−Di(t)),




























L1, L2 2, 20




α1, α2 0.69, 0.09
β1, β2 2.29, 0.30
γ1, γ2 2.1, 0.18
corresponding to equation (9) in the paper. These values are no longer fixed and will evolve
as the pandemic progresses.
2. Set Ii(0) = 0.1× 10−4, Si(0) = 1− Ii(0), and Ri(0) = 0 for all i. For each t ∈ [1, T ]:












−Ωi Ωi 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −κi γi ηi 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −Ωj Ωj 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −κj γj ηj
























where κi = γi + ηi and
Ωi = αi × 2nii(t)× Ii(t) + αj × nij(t)× Ij(t) + αi × nji(t)× Ij(t).
This system corresponds to equations (28)− (31) in the paper. The variable step marks
the number of steps taken within each time period, in this section we use step = 2.
(b) Update nij(t+ 1) and wi(t+ 1) as the values that solve:












πiiwi(t+ 1)Li(1−Di(t+ 1)) + πjiwj(t+ 1)Lj(1−Dj(t+ 1)) = wi(t+ 1)Li(1−Di(t+ 1)).
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Associated Figures
This section in the paper is associated with Figure 7, which uses the parameters described in Table
E.5. These correspond to the first set of parameters in the previous section (associated to Figures
1, 2, and 3). The duration of the disease remains the same, as the exit rate from the infected stage
(γi + ηi) is unchanged, but now both countries experience deaths, with one of them having a much
higher death rate than the other (ηi marks the entry into the dead stage, so ηi/(γi + ηi) marks how
many of those that were infected will end up dying).





L1, L2 3, 3
d12 = d21 1.1




α1, α2 0.04, 0.07
(γi + ηi) 0.20
ηi/(γi + ηi) 0.01, 0.50
E.3 Behavioral Responses - Symmetric Case
Solution Algorithm
1. Choose T (∞) = 500, 000 (some large number), and T = 10, 000. Guess D(∞) = Di.
2. Compute the value of nii(∞), nij(∞), nij(∞), and njj(∞) as the outcome of the equilibrium
that solves












πiiwiLi(1−Di) + πjiwjLj(1−Dj) = wiLi(1−Di),





















corresponding to equation (9) in the paper.
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3. Transversality conditions are satisfied if
lim
t→∞






θsi (t) = 0
Set θki (∞) = θii(∞) = θsi (∞) = 0 and let the economy run without infections between T and
T (∞), that is, for each time period t ∈ [T, T (∞)] update the Lagrange multipliers as
θki (t) = θ
k
i (t+ 1)− [Qi(nii(∞), nij(∞))− Ci(nii(∞), nij(∞))] e−ξt∆t
θii(t) =
1






where ∆t is the step size (one over how many times you update within each day). Keep θk(T )
and θi(T ) as the terminal values of the Lagrange multipliers.
4. Set Ii(T ) = 10
−6, θsi (T ) = 0 and Si(T ) = 1− Ii(T )−Di/(ηi/(γi + ηi)). Recompute ni·(T ) as
the values that solve[
∂Qi(nii(T ), nij(T ))
∂nij
− ∂Ci(nii(T ), nij(T ))
∂nij
]
(1−Di)e−ξT = [θsi (T )− θii(T )]Si(T )αjIj(T ),
corresponding to equation (32) in the paper. Given perfect symmetry between countries, we
will have wi = 1 for all i.
5. For each t ∈ [T, 0] solve the following system of equations, where all values evaluated at t+ 1
are known, to obtain values at t:
θsi (t+ 1)− θsi (t) = [θsi (t)− θii(t)][2αinii(t)Ii(t) + (αjnij(t) + αinji(t))Ij(t)]∆t
θsi (t+ 1)− θii(t) = (γi + ηi)θii(t)∆t− ηiθki (t)∆t
θsk(t+ 1)− θki (t) = [Qi(nii(t), nij(t))− Ci(nii(t), nij(t))] e−ξt∆t
Ii(t+ 1)− Ii(t) = Si(t)[2αinii(t)Ii(t) + (αjnij(t) + αinji(t))Ij(t)]∆t− (γi + ηi)Ii(t)∆t
Si(t+ 1)− Si(t) = −Si(t)[2αinii(t)Ii(t) + (αjnij(t) + αinji(t))Ij(t)]∆t
Di(t+ 1)−Di(t) = ηiIi(t)∆t






(1−Di(t))e−ξt = [θsi (t)− θii(t)]Si(t)αjIj(t).
These correspond to equations (32)-(35) in the paper plus the equations determining the
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evolution of the epidemiological variables, once we have imposed equilibrium conditions.
6. Repeat for all periods until I(t) reaches the desired initial condition, that is, I(t) = 10−5. If
at this t we have |D(t)| < 10−5 stop. Otherwise, adjust guess Di.
Associated Figures
This section in the paper is associated with Figures 8 and 9, which uses the parameters described
in Table E.6.





L1, L2 3, 3
d12 = d21 1.1




α1, α2 0.1, 0.1
γi + ηi 0.20, 0.20
ηi/(γi + ηi) 0.0062, 0.0062
∆t 1/5
ξ 0.05/(365×∆t)
The initial guess used in the code Figure 8 is Di = 0.0022, and the initial guess for Figure 9 is
Di = 0.004.
E.4 Behavioral Responses - Asymmetric Case
Solution Algorithm
1. Choose T (∞) = 500, 000 (some large number), and T = 10,000. Guess D1(∞) = D1. Fix
I1(T ) = 10
−7.
2. Generate a grid for D2(∞) = D2 wide enough to contain the solution (use solution without
behavioral responses as an upper bound for this guess). For each of the points in this grid
(a) Compute the value of nii(∞), nij(∞), nij(∞), and njj(∞) as the outcome of the equi-
librium that solves












πiiwiLi(1−Di) + πjiwjLj(1−Dj) = wiLi(1−Di),
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corresponding to equation (9) in the paper.
(b) Transversality conditions are satisfied if
lim
t→∞






θsi (t) = 0
Set θki (∞) = θii(∞) = θsi (∞) = 0 and let the economy run without infections between T
and T (∞), that is, for each time period t ∈ [T, T (∞)] update the multipliers as
θki (t) = θ
k
i (t+ 1)− [Qi(nii(∞), nij(∞))− Ci(nii(∞), nij(∞))] e−ξt∆t
θii(t) =
1






where ∆t is the step size (one over how many times you update within each day). Keep
θk(T ) and θi(T ) as the terminal values of the Lagrange multipliers.
(c) Guess a value for I2(T ). Set θ
s
i (T ) = 0 and Si(T ) = 1 − Ii(T ) − Di/(ηi/(γi + ηi)).
Recompute ni·(T ) as the values that solve[
∂Qi(nii(T ), nij(T ))
∂nij
− ∂Ci(nii(T ), nij(T ))
∂nij
]
(1−Di)e−ξT = [θsi (T )− θii(T )]Si(T )αjIj(T ),
corresponding to equation (32) in the paper. Given perfect symmetry between countries,
we will have wi = 1 for all i.
i. Given a value for I2(T ), for each t ∈ [T, 0] solve the following system of equations,
where all values evaluated at t+ 1 are known, to obtain values at t:
θsi (t+ 1)− θsi (t) = [θsi (t)− θii(t)][2αinii(t)Ii(t) + (αjnij(t) + αinji(t))Ij(t)]∆t
θsi (t+ 1)− θii(t) = (γi + ηi)θii(t)∆t− ηiθki (t)∆t
θsk(t+ 1)− θki (t) = [Qi(nii(t), nij(t))− Ci(nii(t), nij(t))] e−ξt∆t
Ii(t+ 1)− Ii(t) = Si(t)[2αinii(t)Ii(t) + (αjnij(t) + αinji(t))Ij(t)]∆t− (γi + ηi)Ii(t)∆t
Si(t+ 1)− Si(t) = −Si(t)[2αinii(t)Ii(t) + (αjnij(t) + αinji(t))Ij(t)]∆t
Di(t+ 1)−Di(t) = ηiIi(t)∆t
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(1−Di(t))e−ξt = [θsi (t)−θii(t)]Si(t)αjIj(t).
These correspond to equations (32)-(35) in the paper plus the equations determining
the evolution of the epidemiological variables, once we have imposed equilibrium
conditions.
ii. Given a particular grid, two adjacent guesses of D2 may lead to diverging paths for Ii.
If this is the case, pick the two guesses that split the paths between those diverging
upwards and downwards and re-draw a finer grid for D2 within these bounds.
iii. Repeat for all periods until Ii(t) reaches the desired initial condition, that is, I(t) =
10−5 and Ii(t) < Ii(t+1) in a flat line (meaning it does not diverge to plus or minus
infinity). If at this t we have D1(t) = D2(t) go back to outside layer of the loop.
Otherwise, adjust guess I2(T ).
3. If at this t we have |Di(t)| < 10−5 stop. Otherwise, adjust guess D1.
Associated Figures
This section in the paper is associated with Figure 10, which uses the parameters described in Table
E.7.





L1, L2 3, 3
d12 = d21 1.1




α1, α2 0.1, 0.1
γi + ηi 0.20, 0.20
ηi/(γi + ηi) 0.003, 0.0062
∆t 1/3
ξ 0.05/(365×∆t)
Notes about the Algorithm
This algorithm is not closed, as it still requires a mechanism that will automatically define which
are the bounds for D2 in step 2(c)ii.
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E.5 Adjustment Costs and the Risk of a Pandemic
Solution Algorithm
1. Choose T (∞) = 500, 000 (some large number), and T = 10,000. Guess D(∞) = Di.
2. Compute the value of nii(∞), nij(∞), nij(∞), and njj(∞) as the outcome of the equilibrium
that solves












πiiwiLi(1−Di) + πjiwjLj(1−Dj) = wiLi(1−Di),





















corresponding to equation (9) in the paper.
3. Transversality conditions are satisfied if
lim
t→∞






θsi (t) = 0
Set θki (∞) = θii(∞) = 0 and let the economy run without infections between T and T (∞),
that is, for each time period t ∈ [T, T (∞)] update the multipliers as
θki (t) = θ
k
i (t+ 1)− [Qi(nii(∞), nij(∞))− Ci(nii(∞), nij(∞))] e−ξt∆t
θii(t) =
1






where ∆t is the step size (one over how many times you update within each day). Keep θk(T )
and θi(T ) as the terminal values of the Lagrange multipliers.
4. Set Ii(T ) = 10
−7, θsi (T ) = 0 and Si(T ) = 1− Ii(T )−Di/(ηi/(γi + ηi)). Recompute ni·(T ) as
the values that solve[
∂Qi(nii(T ), nij(T ))
∂nij
− ∂Ci(nii(T ), nij(T ))
∂nij
]
(1−Di)e−ξT = [θsi (T )− θii(T )]Si(T )αjIj(T ),
corresponding to equation (32) in the paper. Given perfect symmetry between countries, we
will have wi = 1 for all i.
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5. For each τ − 1 ∈ [T, 0] solve the following system of equations, where all values evaluated at
τ are known and we have imposed perfect symmetry between countries, to obtain values at t:
θs(τ)− θs(τ − 1) = [θs(τ)− θi(τ)][2αni(τ)I(τ) + 2αnj(τ)I(τ)]∆τ
θs(τ)− θs(τ − 1) = (γ + η)θi(τ)∆τ − ηθk(τ)∆τ
θk(τ)− θk(τ − 1) =
[
Q(nj(τ), nj(τ))− C(ni(τ), nj(τ))− ψ1(|gii (t)|ψ2 + |gij (t)|ψ2)
]
e−ξτ∆τ
I(τ)− I(τ − 1) = S(τ)[2αni(τ)I(τ) + 2αnj(τ)I(τ)]∆τ − (γ + η)I(τ)∆τ
S(τ)− S(τ − 1) = −S(τ)[2αni(τ)I(τ) + 2αnj(τ))I(τ)]∆τ
D(τ)−D(τ − 1) = ηI(τ)∆τ
























− (θs(τ)− θi(τ))× S(τ)× α× I(τ)−
∞∑
t=τ+1
(θs(t)− θi(t))× S(t)× α× I(t)
− ψ1ψ2|




Note that, in contrast to the other cases above, we compute changes as happening between
τ and τ − 1, rather τ + 1 and τ. This makes the system easier to solve backwards, although
the difference in solutions is negligible for small enough step size.
6. Repeat for all periods until I(τ) reaches the desired initial condition, that is, I(τ) = 10−5. If
at this τ we have D(τ) = 0 stop. Otherwise, adjust guess Di.
Associated Figures
This section in the paper is associated with Figure 11, which uses the parameters described in Table
E.8.
28





L1, L2 3, 3
d12 = d21 1.1




α1, α2 0.1, 0.1
γi + ηi 0.20, 0.20
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